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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Preliminary remarks 
Beneficial ownership is perhaps the most important of undefined treaty terms in international 
tax law,1 and has, since its introduction in the OECD Model, been the topic of numerous 
discussions and controversies,2 remaining to this day a highly disputed issue.3 Beneficial 
ownership still lacks a precise international definition. Indeed, no definition is provided by the 
OECD Model, the UN Model nor is the concept usually defined in tax treaties.4 Courts and tax 
authorities have held different interpretations of the concept, which in turn has led to a greater 
risk of double taxation and double non-taxation.5  
1.2  Methodology 
The present contribution will begin by determining the scope and purpose of beneficial 
ownership. A historical analysis of the concept and its evolution in the OECD Commentary will 
be provided to this effect. The focus will then be set on the interpretation of double taxation 
conventions, which will lead the way to defining beneficial ownership and assessing its nature. 
The case law of Switzerland and other OECD member states will then be reviewed and 
commented on a selective basis. The jurisdictions in question were chosen for their varying 
interpretations of beneficial ownership, as illustrated in landmark cases, all of which present 
specific particularities. Beneficial ownership in the European Union will be referred to briefly 
as this contribution is centred on beneficial ownership in tax treaties. In the context of the 
implementation of BEPS Action 6 in the MLI, the principal purposes rule and its interaction 
with beneficial ownership will be explored. Finally, as a premise to a conclusion, the 
alternatives and the future of beneficial ownership will be discussed.  
Owing to the similarities of distribution rules set by articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD MC, 
this contribution will address the issue of beneficial ownership without systematically 
                                                 
1 DU TOIT, Evolution of the Term “Beneficial Ownership”, p. 500. 
2 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 86 ad art. 1. 
3 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership in International Tax Law, p. 2. 
4 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 24. 
5 OECD, Beneficial Owner Discussion Draft 2011, p. 2. 
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differentiating the particularities of dividends, interests, and royalties; at times the neutral 
terminology ‘income’ will be used. 
1.3  Double Taxation Conventions and Treaty Shopping 
Double taxation conventions contain rules which aim to prevent double taxation and double 
non-taxation. As a principle, treaty benefits should not be unduly granted; tax treaties have a 
bilateral nature which restricts the scope of persons who may benefit from them. This study 
focuses on the concept of beneficial ownership, or beneficial ownership test, which is one of 
the pre-BEPS provisions designed to prevent unjustified benefit of double taxation 
conventions.6 Under the OECD and UN Models, the treaty benefits at stake when beneficial 
ownership is considered are the reduction (or exemption) of the source taxation on passive 
incomes (i.e. dividends, interest, and royalties) in the source state. 
In international taxation, the state of source (or source state) is the country in which an income 
arises; the state of residence is the country in which the ‘recipient’ of that income resides. Other 
provisions pursue anti-avoidance goals: The Limitation-on-Benefits rule (hereafter LOB rule), 
the principal purpose test rule (hereafter PPT rule), subject-to-tax clauses, general anti-
avoidance rules (hereafter GAAR) and specific anti-avoidance rules (hereafter SAAR). 
Treaty shopping occurs when a person not resident of a contracting state to a double taxation 
convention, attempts to obtain benefits granted to residents of that state.7 Treaty shopping 
generally occurs through conduit situations or abusive restructurings. There are two types of 
conduit arrangements: direct conduits and stepping stone conduits.  
Direct conduits are achieved by interposing an entity in the state of residence, said entity then 
forwards the income, inbound from the source state, to an entity in a third state, through the 
form of a dividend distribution. Direct conduits lead to no erosion of the taxable base of a 
company as dividends are usually not a deductible expense. In Swiss case law, the X Holding 
ApS case8 is a typical example of a direct conduit structure. 
Stepping stone conduits function similarly, but instead of dividend distribution, the payment 
takes the form of a deductible expense. More precisely, the tax base of the company interposed 
                                                 
6 This has been debated and will be addressed hereafter. 
7 OECD, Action 6 Final Report, p. 17. 
8 FSC Judgment of 28 November 2005, 2A.239/2005; see infra 5.2. 
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in the state of residence is reduced with deductibles expenses (e.g. interests, royalties, 
management fees) paid to the final beneficiary.9 Unlike companies involved in a direct conduit 
strategy, the interposed company in the stepping stone strategy, often, but not always, provides 
services to companies resident of high tax jurisdictions.10 This strategy has been used to transfer 
the profits of multinational enterprises to low tax jurisdictions. 
Abusive restructurings refer to situations where a restructuring takes place to allow the 
application of tax treaty (i.e. treaty shopping) or a more favourable treaty rule (i.e. rule 
shopping). The abusive nature of such restructurings is usually assessed by the timing and 
sequence of events.11 
  
                                                 
9 DE VRIES REILINGH, Droit fiscal international, p. 69. 
10 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
11 DANON/SALOMÉ, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument, p. 214. 
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2 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP  
2.1  Scope of Beneficial Ownership 
The term ‘beneficial owner’ was introduced in articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model in 
1977. These provisions attribute taxing rights, between the state of residence and the state of 
source, on three different types of passive income: dividends, interest and royalties. Most 
countries, whether they are member states of the OECD or not, base their tax treaties on the 
OECD MC. Consequently, the term ‘beneficial owner’ appears in most treaties signed after 
1977. 
The taxing rights of the source state are only restricted (by reduction of source taxation or full 
exemption) if the resident of the other contracting state (i.e. the state of residence) qualifies as 
beneficial owner of dividends, interests and royalties. 
More specifically, in matters of dividends and interests, articles 10(1) and 11(1) provide that 
the ‘other state’ (i.e. state of residence) may tax said incomes. Conversely, articles 10(2) and 
11(2) OECD MC provide that the state of source may tax outbound income. However, under 
the OECD Model rules, the tax levied by the state of source may not:  
Exceed 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a 
company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent of the 
capital of the company paying the dividends.12  
In all other cases, i.e. when the shareholder is a natural person or a company holding less than 
25 percent of the capital, the tax may not exceed 15 percent of the gross amount of the 
dividend.13 The tax retained by the source state on interest payments is set at 10 percent in the 
Model.14 Regarding royalties, article 12(1) OECD MC provides that they “shall only be taxable 
in [the state of residence]”; thus exempting such payments in the state of source. 
The aforementioned tax rates are of course purely indicative and non-binding as the OECD 
Model is a mere template for bilateral negotiations amongst sovereign states. Indeed, tax treaties 
are “diplomatic agreements of a fiscal nature”15 and, hence, primarily the reflection of 
                                                 
12 Art. 10(2)(a) OECD MC. 
13 Art. 10(2)(b) OECD MC. 
14 Art. 11(2) OECD MC. 
15 JAIN, Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test, p. 15. 
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commercial negotiations. In practice, contracting states often adopt tax rates that differ from 
the Model’s. 
Moreover, the differences in tax rates, or even full exemption by the state of source, dictate 
which countries are chosen for conduit strategies: states benefiting from advantageous tax 
treaties with the state of source on one part and the ‘real’ state of residence on the other part, 
being the obvious choice.  
2.2  Purpose of Beneficial Ownership 
Commentators are not unanimous on the purpose of beneficial ownership; the issue is subject 
to debate. 16 Some have argued that its purpose is to ensure that only the real beneficiary may 
benefit from the advantages of a double taxation convention and to prevent that an apparent 
beneficiary is substituted to the former.17 Others have argued that beneficial ownership, more 
precisely, addresses a specific form of abuse affecting the state of source:18 income being 
transferred from the source state to residents of a third state, whom, unlike residents of the state 
of residence, are not entitled to treaty benefits.19  
It has also been argued that ‘beneficial ownership’ was never necessary,20 and that it was only 
introduced because loopholes in domestic tax laws prompted the United Kingdom to influence 
the OECD into adopting the term ‘beneficial owner’. 
However, what is clear is that from 1977 onwards, the taxing rights of the source state on 
dividends, interest and royalties can only be reduced if the resident of the other contracting 
state, i.e. the state of residence, is considered the beneficial owner of the income.21  
The OECD Commentary, throughout its modifications, has not been consistent with the concept 
of beneficial ownership.22 To determine the true purpose of beneficial ownership, a historical 
approach, taking into consideration the amendments to the OECD Commentary is necessary. 
                                                 
16 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 21. 
17 DE VRIES REILINGH, Droit fiscal international, p. 75. 
18 DANON, Clarification of the Meaning of « Beneficial Owner », p. 437. 
19 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 90 ad art. 1; DU TOIT, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties, 
p. 209. 
20 AVERY JONES, The Beneficial Ownership Concept Was Never Necessary in the Model, pp. 333-339. 
21 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 19. 
22 Ibid., m.no. 21. 
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Since the OECD is inconsistent in its understanding of beneficial ownership,23 the evolution of 
the concept in the OECD’s documentation should not only be subject to scrutiny but also to 
criticism. 
2.2.1 ‘Beneficial Owner’ and ‘Paid to’ 
Beneficial ownership has also been considered a clarification of the expression ‘paid to…a 
resident’ found in articles 10, 11, and 12 OECD MC; commentators have argued that there is, 
at the very least, a strong connection between the terms ‘paid to’ and ‘beneficial owner’.24 
Furthermore, the OECD Commentary has also mentioned that ‘beneficial ownership’ was 
added to address potential difficulties arising from the words ‘paid to’.25 There is no consensus 
on this position and it has been challenged by numerous commentators.26 Indeed, the OECD 
Commentary of 2014 is less explicit than the 2003 version; the latter stated that the term 
beneficial owner was a ‘mere clarification’ of ‘paid to…a resident’,27 whereas the 2014 version 
is somewhat less resolute on the issue.  
If beneficial ownership were to be considered a clarification of ‘paid to’, the concept would 
essentially be no more than an attribution of income rule. Moreover, it has been argued that the 
OECD’s intent was to “make the limitation of tax at source dependent on more substantive 
characteristics of the claimant.”28  
2.2.2 Beneficial Ownership Before 1977 
The term ‘Beneficial owner’ made its first appearance in a tax treaty in the 1966 Protocol to the 
US-UK double taxation convention of 1945.29 An explanatory note attached to the copy of the 
Protocol stated that:  
Relief from tax on dividends, interests and royalties… in the country of origin will no 
longer depend on whether the recipient is subject to tax in the other country, but will 
depend on the income being beneficially owned by a resident of the other country.30  
                                                 
23 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 385; KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 
Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 20. 
24 REIMER, How to Conceptualize Beneficial Ownership, pp. 258-260. 
25 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12.1 ad art. 10; para. 9.1 ad art. 11; para. 4.5 ad art. 12; see infra 2.3.5.3. 
26 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 6. 
27 See infra 2.3.5. 
28 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 44. 
29 DU TOIT, Evolution of the Term “Beneficial Ownership”, para. 1. 
30 Ibid. para. 3.2.1. 
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This amendment eliminated a subject to tax provision by introducing what seems to have been 
the first beneficial ownership test. As both jurisdictions follow common law, the meaning of 
the term was presumably the one found therein31 and therefore caused no interpretation 
difficulty other than understanding what beneficial ownership means in common law.32  
2.3  Evolution of Beneficial Ownership in the OECD Model and Commentary 
As previously mentioned, there is no consensus on the purpose of beneficial ownership, part of 
this is to be attributed to the changes in the OECD’s documentation. Indeed, the concept of 
beneficial ownership and the provisions where it appears have been substantially modified since 
1977. Consequently, an overview of these modifications is essential to grasp and construe the 
concept of beneficial ownership. 
2.3.1 1977 OECD Model and Commentary 
2.3.1.1  Articles 10 and 11 
Following the 1974 Model Tax Convention Draft, beneficial ownership was added to the 1977 
OECD Model.33 The OECD Commentary of 1977 on articles 10(2) and 11(2) was rather brief,34 
and only stated that:  
The limitation of tax in the State of source is not available when an intermediary, such 
as an agent or nominee, is interposed between the beneficiary and the payer, unless the 
beneficial owner is a resident of the other Contracting State.35  
This restrictive interpretation36 was, at least, designed to prevent treaty benefits from being 
granted to agents and nominees,37 it thus seems that beneficial ownership was not originally 
meant to deal with conduit companies or income attribution conflicts.38 It was, however, later 
argued that agents and nominees were only illustrative examples, and that the concept was 
initially meant to exclude conduit companies.39  
                                                 
31 DU TOIT, Evolution of the Term “Beneficial Ownership”, dissenting: AVERY JONES et al., The Origins of 
Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 249. 
32 See infra 2.4.2. 
33 AVERY JONES et al., The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 249. 
34 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 109. 
35 OECD Commentary 1977, para. 12 ad art. 10, see also OECD Commentary 1977, para. 8 ad art. 11. 
36 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 109. 
37 OLIVER et al., Beneficial Ownership, p. 320. 
38 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 295 et seq. 
39 OECD, Conduit Companies Report, p. 8, para. 14(b). 
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The discussions of the Working Parties that drafted the 1977 OECD Commentary did not deal 
with beneficial ownership in a conduit context.40 Vann has argued that “the OECD original 
elaboration of the meaning of beneficial ownership has nothing to do with holding and conduit 
companies, conflicts of attribution or related issues.”41  
Interestingly, the beneficial ownership test was preferred to a subject-to-tax clause,42 allegedly 
because of various problems this choice would have created.43 The wording ‘final recipient’ 
was also envisaged.44 
2.3.1.2 Article 1  
Since 1977, the OECD Commentary of article 1 has stated that “some forms of tax avoidance 
have already been expressly dealt with in the Convention, e.g. by the introduction of the concept 
of ‘beneficial owner’ […].”45 As this example provided by the OECD shows, an initial 
contradiction already appeared in early publications of the organisation. Indeed, paragraph 10 
under article 1 of the OECD Commentary seems to consider the introduction of a beneficial 
ownership test to be akin to that of an anti-avoidance provision. However, in 1977, the OECD 
Commentary simply mentioned46 that the role of ‘beneficial ownership’ was to prevent agents 
and nominees from being granted a tax relief by the source state.  
2.3.2 1995 and 1997 Amendments 
Articles 10(2) and 11(2) OECD MC were amended in 1995, the modification was a 
reformulation from “if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends” to “if the beneficial 
owner of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State”. The amendment to the 
Model was explained, in the Commentary, as being a clarification since all member states had 
consistently shared this position.47 
Before 1997, article 12 of OECD MC and the Commentary did not provide for a beneficial 
ownership test as a condition to benefit from the tax exemption of royalties arising in the source 
                                                 
40 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 32. 
41 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 288. 
42 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 21. 
43 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 282 et seq. 
44 OLIVER et al., Beneficial Ownership, p. 318. 
45 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 10 ad art. 1. 
46 OECD Commentary 1977, para. 12 ad art. 10 and OECD Commentary 1977 para. 8 ad art. 11. 
47 OECD Commentary 1995, para. 12 ad art. 10 and para. 8 ad art. 11. 
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state. Following the 1997 amendment to article 12(1) of the OECD Model, the Commentary 
mentioned that the “royalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident 
of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State [emphasis added].”48 
2.3.3 2003 OECD Commentary 
The OECD published the Conduit Companies Report in 1987 which stated that:  
The Commentaries mention the case of a nominee or agent. The provisions would, 
however, apply also to other cases where a person enters into contracts or takes over 
obligations under which he has a similar function to those of a nominee or agent. Thus 
a conduit company can normally not be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though 
the formal owner of certain assets, it has very narrow powers which render it a mere 
fiduciary or an administrator acting on account of the interested parties [emphasis 
added].49 
In other words, the report equated nominees and agents to conduit companies that have ‘very 
narrow powers’.50 However, not all conduit companies were concerned as the report also stated 
that if a conduit company’s “main function is to hold assets or rights [that] is not itself sufficient 
to categorise it as a mere intermediary”.51  
The 2003 OECD Commentary was accordingly amended to provide that:  
The requirement of beneficial ownership was introduced in paragraph 2 of Article 10 
to clarify the meaning of the words ‘paid ... to a resident’ as they are used in 
paragraph 1 of the Article. It makes plain that the State of source is not obliged to give 
up taxing rights over dividend income merely because that income was immediately 
received by a resident of a State with which the State of source had concluded a 
convention. Furthermore, the term “beneficial owner” is not used in a narrow 
technical sense, rather, it should be understood in its context and in light of the object 
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion and avoidance [emphasis added].52 
The relationship between ‘paid to’ and ‘beneficial owner’ was first mentioned by the OECD in 
this amendment, the issue is covered under section 2.2.1 of this paper.  
The Commentary provides that beneficial ownership is not to be understood in a ‘narrow 
technical sense’; the precise meaning of this statement was explained in more detail in the 2014 
                                                 
48 OECD Commentary 1997 para. 5 ad art. 12. 
49 OECD, Conduit Companies Report of 1987, p. 8. 
50 OLIVER et al., Beneficial Ownership, p. 320. 
51 OECD, Conduit Companies Report of 1987, p. 8. 
52 OECD Commentary 2003, para. 12 ad art. 10 and para. 8 ad art. 11. 
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amendment.53 It follows, that contrary to a ‘narrow technical sense’, beneficial ownership was 
here intended to be interpreted in the context and object of the double taxation convention, i.e. 
given a broad interpretation. 
It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the 
State of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a Contracting State, 
otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply acts as a conduit for 
another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income concerned. For these 
reasons, the report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled “Double Taxation 
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies” concludes that a conduit company 
cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the formal owner, it 
has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation to the 
income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the 
interested parties [emphasis added]. 54 
Agents, nominees and conduit companies share an attribute: very limited power and control 
over the income they receive.55 The inclusion of conduit companies to the OECD Commentary 
marks a more defined anti-avoidance nature with regards to beneficial ownership. Indeed, the 
Commentary here provides for an exclusion of conduit companies through the beneficial 
ownership test if the conduit company, although formal owner of an income, only disposes of 
very narrow power on it.  
It is clear that the OECD shifted its approach, to an economic one, in the 2003 OECD 
Commentary, as opposed to the attribution of income rule56 or narrow anti-abuse provision57 
beneficial ownership was previously considered to be. 
2.3.4 The CIV Report and Hybrid Entities 
The extent to which hybrid entities can be considered beneficial owners, and thus benefit from 
double taxation conventions, is a complex question. Indeed, hybrid entities are not usually 
recognised as legal persons, yet the individuals to whom they benefit do not commonly hold 
enough control over them to be considered ‘beneficial owners’. For instance, the situation of 
collective investment vehicle (hereafter CIV) investors is substantially (legally and 
                                                 
53 See infra 2.3.5.3. 
54 OECD Commentary 2003, para. 12.1 ad art. 10; see also para. 8.1 ad art. 11. 
55 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 52. 
56 Ibid., p. 54. 
57 See supra 2.3.1.2. 
11 
 
economically) distinct, in most countries, from that of investors who own underlying assets.58 
Thus, considering CIV investors to be beneficial owners would be inappropriate. 
Several updates to the OECD documentation were published to address the issue. Following 
the publication of the CIV Report, the OECD Commentary was amended in 2010 to address 
the question of CIVs. The Report states: 
[…] a widely-held CIV, as defined in paragraph 4, should be treated as the beneficial 
owner of the income it receives, so long as the managers of the CIV have discretionary 
powers to manage the assets on behalf of the holders of interests in the CIV and, of 
course, so long as it also meets the requirements that it be a “person” and a “resident” 
of the State in which it is established. This conclusion, however, relates only to those 
economic characteristics that are specific to a CIV. It does not suggest that a CIV is in 
a different or better position than other investors with respect to aspects of the 
beneficial ownership requirement that are unrelated to the CIV’s status as such. For 
example, where an individual receiving an item of income in certain circumstances 
would not be considered as the beneficial owner of that income, a CIV receiving that 
income in the same circumstances could not be deemed to be the beneficial owner of 
the income [emphasis added].59 
The OECD considers that managerial discretionary powers and widely-held capital are 
determinant in considering a CIV to be the beneficial owner of income. However, an important 
caveat is mentioned in the CIV report: a CIV may not be considered beneficial owner of an 
income if an individual resident of the state, receiving the income in the same circumstances 
would not have been considered beneficial owner.60 
Trusts were somewhat considered in the 2011 Discussion Draft and its revised 2012 version61 
which mentions, regrettably in a simple footnote, that: 
For example, where the trustees of a discretionary trust do not distribute dividends 
earned during a given period, these trustees, acting in their capacity as such […], could 
constitute the beneficial owners of such income for the purpose of Article 10 even if 
they are not the beneficial owners under the relevant trust law [emphasis added].62 
Danon and Salomé have held that under this definition, the trustees of a discretionary 
accumulation trust may be considered beneficial owners,63  to the extent that the trustee’s 
                                                 
58 OECD, CIV Report, p. 9. 
59 Ibid., p. 10. 
60 DANON/SALOMÉ, La notion de bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 43 ad art. 1. 
61 See infra 2.3.5.1 and 2.3.5.2.  
62 OECD, Revised Draft 2012, p. 3. 
63 DANON/SALOMÉ, La notion de bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 44 ad art. 1. 
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powers allow him to decide on income attribution to the trust’s beneficiaries.64 Conversely, the 
trustees of a fixed trust, wherein an obligation to distribute income to determined beneficiaries 
is found, do not satisfy the beneficial ownership test.65 It should be noted that Danon had already 
previously argued that the discretionary powers of the trustees should be the decisive criterion 
in attributing beneficial ownership.66  
Moreover, the authors consider that beneficial ownership must be distinguished from personal 
attribution of income.67 Consequently, the source state income must be fiscally attributed to the 
hybrid entity according to the attribution rules of the state of residence.68 In this only case, the 
beneficial ownership test is to be conducted on the hybrid entity. However, if the residence state 
considers that the income is to be directly fiscally attributed to the persons benefiting from the 
hybrid entity (i.e. the entity is considered transparent for tax purposes or an anti-abuse rule is 
applied), beneficial ownership of the income is to be examined in consideration of the persons 
benefiting from the hybrid entity.69 
In my opinion, the OECD was correct in finding that the trustees could be considered beneficial 
owners for the purpose of article 10 despite not being beneficial owners in the applicable 
(domestic) trust law. Indeed, there was, and arguably still is, a necessity to distinguish beneficial 
ownership as understood in trust law and beneficial ownership as an autonomous treaty concept 
of international tax law, regardless of the lexical origin of beneficial ownership being common 
law.70 
2.3.5 2014 OECD Commentary 
Prior to the 2014 revision of the OECD Commentary, a Discussion Draft (2011) and its revised 
version (2012) were published by the OECD. This process allowed numerous commentators to 
express ongoing issues relating to beneficial ownership. Both drafts have proven useful to 
somewhat assert what is and is not meant in the 2014 Commentary. Two landmark decisions, 
                                                 
64 DANON, Clarification de la notion de bénéficiaire effectif, p. 586. 
65 DANON, Clarification of the Meaning of « Beneficial Owner », p. 440. 
66 DANON, Switzerland’s direct and international taxation of private express trusts, p. 343 et seq. 
67 DANON/SALOMÉ, La notion de bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 42 ad art. 1. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See infra 2.4.2. 
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Indofood71 and Prévost,72 were issued before this update, and arguably were amongst the 
reasons that prompted the OECD to attempt to clarify beneficial ownership. 
2.3.5.1  2011 Discussion Draft 
The 2011 Discussion Draft, presumably the first attempt by the OECD to define beneficial 
ownership, proposed a new paragraph 12.4 under article 10, which stated that:  
The recipient of a dividend is the “beneficial owner” of that dividend where he has the 
full right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal 
obligation to pass the payment received to another person [emphasis added].73 
This definition focused on the attributes of the beneficial owner, namely: full right of use and 
enjoyment. The focus on enjoyment rather than economic control was criticised.74 Furthermore, 
a rephrasing of paragraphs 12 and 12.1 to article 10 OECD MC, in which the verb ‘received’ 
was replaced by ‘paid’, was suggested. 
The 2011 Discussion Draft and the 2012 Revised Discussion Draft mentioned the relation 
between domestic law and beneficial ownership. This topic is covered hereafter in section 4.1. 
The proposed amendments were commented by numerous authors and institutions. The 
OECD’s objective of clarifying the concept of beneficial ownership was welcomed75 and 
regarded as an excellent initiative.76 However, the commentators mentioned that some of the 
proposed amendments would likely increase confusion.77 
2.3.5.2  2012 Revised Discussion Draft 
The 2012 Revised Discussion Draft was published following the comments on the 2011 version. 
The 2011 Discussion Draft was welcomed as a long-awaited clarification to the concept of 
beneficial ownership but was nonetheless met with some criticism.78 As a result, the 2012 
                                                 
71 See infra 7.2. 
72 See infra 7.1.1. 
73 OECD, Discussion Draft 2011, p. 3. 
74 DANON, Clarification of the Meaning of « Beneficial Owner », p. 439. 
75 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership p. 63. 
76 AVERY JONES/VANN/WHEELER, Response to the 2011 OECD Discussion Draft, p. 1. 
77 AVERY JONES/VANN/WHEELER, Response to the 2011 OECD Discussion Draft, p. 1 ; DANON, Clarification of 
the Meaning of « Beneficial Owner », p. 441. 
78 Ibid. 
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version presented substantial modifications. Perhaps most important was the amended 
definition of beneficial ownership, which now read: 
[t]he recipient of the dividend is not the beneficial owner because that recipient’s right 
to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to 
pass on the payment received to another person.79 
It is crucial to note that under this definition, contractual and legal obligations that are unrelated 
to the received payment are not considered to constrain the right to use and enjoy the dividend. 
The fact that the recipient uses such payment to meet unrelated obligations is thus irrelevant. 
2.3.5.3  2014 Amendments  
Following the 2014 amendments, the OECD Commentary no longer states that ‘beneficial 
ownership was a mere clarification of ‘paid to’.80 This has been considered an important change 
which may affect future case law,81  as some cases on beneficial ownership were judged by 
courts who had specifically taken into account this consideration (e.g. the Diebold case in 
France82). Furthermore, some courts might decide not to confirm past decisions following this 
evolution of the OECD Commentary.83 Kemmeren argues that “it can be upheld that this case 
law [on beneficial ownership] has been based on a wrong assumption and can no longer be 
upheld.”84 
The suggestions of the 2012 Revised Discussion Draft were implemented in the 2014 OECD 
Commentary with minor changes.85 The OECD considered that the amendments were a mere 
clarification that beneficial ownership was not to be construed in a ‘narrow technical sense’.  
Furthermore, a new paragraph 12.4 to article 10, was introduced : 
In these various examples (agent, nominee, conduit company acting as a fiduciary or 
administrator), the direct recipient of the dividend is not the “beneficial owner” 
because that recipient’s right to use and enjoy the dividends constrained by a 
contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person. Such 
an obligation will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be 
found to exist on the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in substance, the 
                                                 
79 OECD, Revised Proposals 2012, pp. 6-7. 
80 See supra 2.2.1. 
81 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 6. 
82 infra 7.4.1 
83 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 6. 
84 Ibid., m.no. 23. 
85 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 72. 
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recipient clearly does not have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained 
by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person.  
It follows that the OECD clearly adopts a substance over form approach in this amendment. 
The 2014 modifications result in what has been described as a ‘targeted hybrid approach’ to 
beneficial ownership.86 Under this conception, legal factors are determinant in assessing 
beneficial ownership (e.g. a contractual obligation), however, when confronted with aggressive 
treaty shopping cases, economic considerations take importance.87 
The approach taken by the 2014 OECD Commentary on the question of domestic law is 
addressed hereafter under section 4.1. 
2.3.6 Modifications: Conclusion 
Under the OECD’s conception, beneficial ownership was initially defined restrictively, only 
agents and nominees were excluded. As of 2003, the concept was substantially modified, the 
focus shifting on teleological considerations. In the 2010 CIV Report the notion of beneficial 
ownership seems to have been centred on discretionary powers, i.e. economic control.  
Moreover, the OECD Commentary can be inconsistent. For the sake of example, the 
Commentary provides that “[f]or instance, some forms of tax avoidance have already been 
expressly dealt with in the Convention, e.g. by the introduction of the concept of ‘beneficial 
owner’ […]”88 but previously also mentioned that beneficial ownership was added to clarify 
the meaning of the words ‘paid to a resident’.89 
The modifications to the OECD material, although numerous, did not precisely define 
‘beneficial ownership’. Furthermore, some modifications, although they were considered 
clarifications by the organisation, were unclear. This uncertainty has led to lack of consensus, 
and thus contrasting judicial interpretation in different states.  
It can be agreed upon that as of 2014, the OECD Commentary provides for a narrower meaning 
of beneficial ownership than the one provided for in the 2003 Commentary. As of 2014, 
beneficial ownership as understood in the Commentary does not have the narrow “technical 
                                                 
86 WARDZYNSKI, Hybrid Approach to Beneficial Ownership, p. 183. 
87 Ibid., p. 186 et seq. 
88 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 10 ad art. 1. 
89 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12 ad art. 10. 
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meaning it [may have] under [the] domestic law of a specific country”.90 Agents, nominees and 
some conduit companies are excluded from treaty benefits by the beneficial ownership 
requirement. More specifically, conduit companies acting as mere fiduciaries or administrators 
are excluded as they lack the “right to use and enjoy” income91 without being constrained by a 
contractual or legal obligation to forward to another person the received income. However, such 
obligations do not include “obligations that are not dependent on the receipt of the payment by 
the direct recipient.”92 
2.4  Origin of Beneficial Ownership 
2.4.1 Beneficial Ownership in Early Tax Treaties 
The term ‘beneficial owner’ was incorporated in articles 10 and 11 of the OECD Model in 1977, 
but the concept of beneficial ownership antedates this amendment of the Model. Indeed, the 
first occurrence of the term ‘beneficial owner’ in international tax law can be traced to the 
Canada-United States 1942 tax treaty, the United Kingdom later used the term in some of its 
treaties throughout the 1940s and 1950s.93 
2.4.2 Beneficial Ownership in Common Law 
Prior to its use in tax treaties, beneficial, or equitable, ownership was conceived in opposition 
to legal ownership, the latter being somewhat the position of a trustee in relation to a trust’s 
assets. In English law for instance, a trustee is the ‘legal owner’ of the trust property and holds 
it for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustee has fiduciary responsibilities to the beneficial 
owner of the property, who has no title to the property but does have rights in the property.94 
The origin of the concept of beneficial ownership is in common law, more precisely trust law, 
wherein it is often used in contrast to legal ownership.95 According to different domestic 
common law courts, which have varying interpretations, the essence of beneficial ownership 
lies in enjoying the economic benefits of the underlying property as well as control over the 
disposition of said property.96 The concept is not identical to economic ownership, a concept 
                                                 
90 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12.1 ad art. 10 and para. 9.1 ad art. 11. 
91 Dividends, interests or royalties. 
92 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12.4 ad art. 10. 
93 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 271. 
94 AVERY JONES et. al, The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 246. 
95 IBFD Tax Research Platform, Glossary: Beneficial owner. 
96 Ibid. 
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found in civil law, as the latter usually refers to contractual rights whereas a beneficial owner 
can usually uphold his rights against third parties.97  
Despite common law jurisdictions sharing many rules and concepts, there is no single meaning 
of beneficial ownership shared by those states, on the contrary, the meaning sometimes even 
varies in one jurisdiction. For instance, in the Prévost case,98 the Tax Court of Canada referred 
to the publications of two commentators99, 100 both of whom agreed that “beneficial ownership 
has different meanings under the Canadian Income Tax Act depending on the provision and 
that there is no settled definition of beneficial ownership even under common law [emphasis 
added].”101 
Moreover, to find a term with origins in common law in the OECD Model is somewhat of an 
oddity when considering that most terms found in the Model are derived from civil law. The 
importance of civil law in the OECD Model can be attributed in part to its precursors, the 
League of Nations Models102 (wherein the term ‘beneficial owner’ was not used103) – which 
were mostly influenced by civil law European countries’ treaty practice104 – and probably to 
the membership of the OECD. In 1977, when the term ‘beneficial ownership’ was added to the 
OECD Model, only 6105 of the 24 member states were common law jurisdictions.106 Despite the 
difficulties beneficial ownership has raised in common law, the term ‘beneficial owner’ has 
been introduced in EU directives.107 
  
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, para. 65 and 66; see infra 7.1.1. 
99 BROWN, Beneficial Ownership in Canadian Income Tax Law, p. 424 et seq. 
100 BRENDER, Beneficial Ownership in Canadian Income Tax Law, p. 315 et seq. 
101 DU TOIT, Evolution of the Term “Beneficial Ownership”, para. 3.2.1. 
102 AVERY JONES et. al, The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 220. 
103 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 268. 
104 AVERY JONES et. al, The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 220. 
105 Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
106 Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, para. 59. 
107 AVERY JONES et. al, The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model, p. 247; see infra 6. 
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3 INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES 
Beneficial ownership is undefined in the OECD MC and most double taxation conventions. As 
a result, courts dealing with the concept are often required to interpret it. The interpretation of 
tax treaties is a complex matter which can pose numerous issues. Before attempting to interpret 
and define beneficial ownership, an overview of the rules of treaty interpretation is necessary. 
3.1  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter VCLT), governs the interpretation of 
international treaties. Commentators agree that the VCLT is not only an international treaty but 
also corresponds to the general principles of customary international law,108 therefore, states 
that have not ratified the VCLT are still bound by it.109 
Article 1 VCLT stipulates that “the present Convention applies to treaties between states”. The 
VCLT defines a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”110 These provisions clearly 
indicate that tax treaties fall under the scope of the VCLT and that their interpretation is thus 
governed by the rules therein. This opinion has been followed by Swiss courts and is prevalent 
amongst commentators.111  
The rules of interpretation of the VCLT, critical to interpret tax treaties, are laid down in articles 
31, 32 and 33. 
3.1.1 Article 31 VCLT 
Pursuant to article 31(1) VCLT, a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”112 It follows, that double taxation conventions must be interpreted in 
accordance with their object and purpose: the avoidance of double taxation. 
                                                 
108 LANG, Article 3 paragraphe 2, m.no. 47; FSC Judgment of 4 April 2006, 2A.416/2005, para 3.3.1 
109 VOGEL/RUST, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Introduction m.no. 68. 
110 Art. 2(1)(a) VCLT. 
111 OBERSON, Droit fiscal international, p. 36 and commentators mentioned therein. 
112 Art. 31(1) VCLT. 
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Article 31(2) VCLT states that the ‘context’ mentioned in article 31(1) includes, not only the 
text of a treaty but also the preambles and annexes thereof. Article 31(4) provides that “a special 
meaning shall be given to a term if its established that the parties so intended.” 
There is no consensus on what is the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a term. Commentators have for 
instance proposed that the ordinary meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ may well be 
that which it has in common law113 – the system in which the origins of beneficial ownership 
can be traced to114 – but also its meaning in the OECD Commentary115 or its meaning in 
‘international tax language’.116 
3.1.2 Article 32 VCLT 
Article 32 VCLT allows the recourse to supplementary means of interpretation. These include 
preparatory works as well as the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion. The use of the 
preposition ‘including’ clarifies that the enumeration of article 32 VCLT is non-exclusive.117 
However, supplementary means of interpretation can only be taken into account “to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31 or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”118 Despite the wording of the provision, 
historical interpretation is not subsidiary.119 Indeed, the intentions of the parties, relevant under 
article 31(4) CVLT, may be revealed by a historical interpretation.120 
3.2  Article 3(2) OECD MC 
Article 3(2) is the provision of the OECD MC which covers the interpretation of double taxation 
conventions. Article 3(2) is considered a specific rule (lex specialis) to the VCLT.121 The article 
provides that:  
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any 
term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning 
                                                 
113 DU TOIT, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties, p. 197. 
114 See supra 2.4.2. 
115 DANON, Switzerland’s direct and international taxation of private express trusts, p. 332; see infra 3.2. 
116 VOGEL/RUST, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Introduction para. 86. Modifier mauvaise édition. 
117 OESTERHELT, Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, p. 377. 
118 Art. 32(a) and (b) VCLT. 
119 LANG, Article 3 paragraphe 2, m.no. 51. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., m.no. 47. 
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that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which 
the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State 
prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State.122 
The OECD Commentary123 clarifies that if, pursuant to article 3(2) OECD MC, domestic law 
is applicable to a treaty, the relevant legislation is the one at the time of the treaty’s application, 
and not at the time of the treaty’s adoption. This an example of an ambulatory approach.  
Article 3(2) OECD MC restricts interpretation under domestic law when the context otherwise 
requires. Most commentators argue for a broad meaning and suggest considering the object and 
purpose of the treaty. According, to the OECD, ‘context’ in article 3(2) OECD Model does not 
have the same meaning as ‘context’ in the VCLT.124 Commentators agree that the context as 
understood in article 3(2) incorporates both the OECD MC and the OECD commentary. 
The debate on a domestic or international autonomous meaning of beneficial ownership, owed 
to article 3(2) OECD Model, is covered hereafter in section 4.1.  
3.3  OECD Commentary 
According to the OECD:  
The worldwide recognition of the provisions of the Model Convention and their 
incorporation into a majority of bilateral conventions have helped make the 
Commentaries on the provisions of the Model Convention a widely-accepted guide to 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of existing bilateral conventions. 
This has facilitated the interpretation and the enforcement of these bilateral 
conventions along common lines. As the network of tax conventions continues to 
expand, the importance of such a generally accepted guide becomes all the greater 
[emphasis added].125 
Commentators overwhelmingly agree that the OECD Model and OECD Commentary can be 
deemed relevant under the VCLT. According to Vogel, Baumgartner and du Toit, the OECD 
Model and the OECD Commentary are descriptive of the ‘ordinary meaning’ mentioned under 
article 31(1) of the VCLT. Ault, Lang, Rust and Vogel126 agree that if OECD member states 
                                                 
122 Art. 3(2) OECD MC. 
123 OECD Commentary 2003, para. 11 ad art. 3. 
124 OECD Commentary, para. 13.1 ad art. 3. 
125 OECD MC 2014, Introduction, para. 15. 
126 AULT, OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, p. 146 et seq.; LANG, Article 3 paragraphe 
2, m.no. 54; VOGEL/RUST, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Introduction, m.no. 101. 
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conclude a treaty on the basis of the OECD Model, the provisions of the double taxation 
convention should be presumed to have the meaning of the same provisions in the Model. 
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4 NATURE AND MEANING OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 
To define beneficial ownership first requires determining where the definition should be found. 
There is no consensus on the question and national courts have held different opinions. Most 
authors consider beneficial ownership to have an autonomous treaty meaning. This position 
was also followed by the Court of Appeal in the Indofood case.127  
As beneficial ownership is not defined in the OECD MC, and seldom in double taxation 
conventions, article 3(2) of the Model is usually applicable. It is commonly accepted that 
defining beneficial ownership meets this contextual requirement. Given that the context 
requires, where must that meaning be found? Two contenders have been proposed: a domestic 
law meaning and an international meaning. 
The OECD’s Glossary of Tax Terms defines the beneficial owner as “a person who enjoys the 
real benefits of ownership, even though the title to the property is in another name”128 further 
specifying that the concept is “often important in tax treaties, as a resident of a tax treaty partner 
may be denied the benefits of certain reduced withholding tax rates if the beneficial owner of 
the dividends etc is resident of a third country.”129 Numerous commentators have proposed their 
definition of beneficial ownership,130 to cite them here would, however, go beyond the 
reasonable scope of this contribution. 
4.1  Domestic Law Meaning of Beneficial Ownership  
Article 3(2) OECD MC provides that terms not defined in a treaty are to be defined according 
to the domestic law of the state applying the treaty, ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. 
There has been a debate on whether the meaning of beneficial ownership should be found in 
domestic law or whether it had an autonomous treaty meaning. Commentators favouring a 
domestic law meaning of the concept, have suggested that in common law jurisdictions the 
concept is ‘well-known’.131 It has also been argued that the verb ‘requires’ in article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model is a ‘word of force’, making it difficult to apply an autonomous treaty meaning.132 
                                                 
127 See infra 7.2. 
128 OECD, Glossary of Tax Terms. 
129 Ibid. 
130 For an overview see MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 77 et seq. 
131 DU TOIT, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties, p. 173. 
132 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 295. 
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Most commentators, however, agree that beneficial ownership has an autonomous treaty 
meaning.133 Under this conception, the context of article 3(2) OECD MC requires that the 
concept is defined under VCLT rules. It follows that the source state should avoid construing 
beneficial ownership according to its domestic law, partly because most contracting states do 
not have a definition of beneficial ownership in their legislation. Moreover, the tax relief 
provided by articles 10, 11 and 12 is contingent on the recipient of the income being the 
beneficial owner thereof; if a treaty definition is given to beneficial ownership, the risk of 
divergence, and thus of double taxation, is avoided, 134  whereas domestic law application 
increases that risk.135  
In the United Kingdom, the ‘international fiscal meaning’ of beneficial ownership has been 
recognised by the Court of Appeal,136 there is, however, no consensus on the question amongst 
OECD member states.137 
Before 2003 the OECD’s position was unclear. According to Meindl-Ringler,138 the OECD has 
generally favoured autonomous treaty definitions. This would be backed by the fact that the 
OECD Commentary, for instance, provides with respect to the definition of ‘interest’ that “in 
the Model Convention reference to domestic law should as far as possible be avoided.”139 
However, no similar remark had been made on beneficial ownership in the Commentary.140 As 
of 2014, the OECD Commentary does state that beneficial ownership:  
[…] was intended to be interpreted in [the] context [of paid to… a resident] and not to 
refer to any technical meaning that it could have had under the domestic law of a 
specific country (in fact, when it was added to the paragraph, the term did not have a 
precise meaning in the law of many countries).141  
The 2011 Discussion Draft suggested an amendment to the previously quoted paragraph which 
would have provided that:  
                                                 
133 DANON, La notion de bénéficiaire effectif, p. 40; DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 97; 
OBERSON, Bénéficiaire effectif, p. 220; MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 295. 
134 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 97. 
135 OBERSON, Bénéficiaire effectif, p. 220; OLIVER et al., Beneficial Ownership, p. 323. 
136 See infra 7.2.2. 
137 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 98. 
138 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 296. 
139 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 21 ad art. 11. 
140 MEINDL-RINGLER, Beneficial Ownership, p. 296. 
141 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12.1 ad art. 10, and para. 9.1 ad art. 11.  
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This does not mean however, that the domestic law meaning of “beneficial owner” is 
automatically irrelevant for the interpretation of that term in the context of the Article: 
that domestic law meaning is applicable to the extent that it is consistent with the 
general guidance included in this Commentary.142 
The Revised Draft of 2012 abandoned this amendment,143 which was described as incoherent. 
Indeed, the qualification of beneficial ownership as an autonomous treaty concept, commands 
that the subject matter must be exclusively determined under articles 31 and 32 CVLT.144 
4.2  Ultimate Beneficial Owner and Beneficial Owner 
Ultimate beneficial ownership and beneficial ownership should not be confused. Since 2014, 
the OECD Commentary states that, in the context of article 10, 11 and 12, beneficial ownership 
does not have the meaning that it has been given in other instruments.145 The Commentary 
refers here, inter alia, to the Financial Action Task Force’s documentation, which defines the 
beneficial owner, in the context of money laundering, as the natural person who ultimately owns 
a legal person. For a tax treaty purpose beneficial ownership has nothing to do with this 
definition. Indeed, interpreting beneficial ownership according to economic reality does not 
involve a look through approach, i.e. full transparency. The distinction between beneficial 
owner and ‘ultimate’ beneficial owner is critical when apprehending a group of companies and 
holding structures. According to Danon and Dinh, within a group, the criterion of economic 
control should not lead to ignore intermediary entities in sole consideration of the ultimate 
shareholder.146  
4.3  Implied Beneficial Ownership 
Before the 2014 modifications, some states already considered the beneficial owner clause to 
be implied or implicit in treaty law. Under this conception, passive income attribution rules of 
tax treaties, even when adopted before 1977, were considered subject to the clause even if not 
expressly mentioned in the text of the treaty.147 This opinion was backed by the fact that 
according to the OECD Commentary, the term beneficial owner only clarifies the meaning of 
                                                 
142 2011 Discussion Draft, p. 3. 
143 2012 Revised Draft, p. 14. 
144 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 99. 
145 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12.6 ad art. 10, para. 10.4 ad art. 11 and para. 4.5 ad art. 12. 
146 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 120. 
147 Ibid., m.no. 87. 
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the words ‘paid… to a resident.’148 Both France149 and Switzerland150 have privileged this 
approach.  
This position has been criticized151 as the language ‘paid… to a resident’ only deals with the 
personal attribution of income required by a tax treaty (not to be confused with the concept of 
residency152). Danon has further argued that the implicit beneficial ownership criterion should 
be construed under article 1 OECD MC153 (which deals with ‘persons covered’ by the treaty) 
and fulfils the principle of the relative effect of double taxation conventions in treaty abuse.154  
De Broe and von Frenckell suggest that the cumulative application of the implied anti-abuse 
rule is contradicted by article 31(1) of the VCLT, a provision which establishes the principle of 
the primacy of textual interpretation. Both commentators consider that since the text of the 
treaty reflects first and foremost the intention of the parties, the intentions of the contracting 
states should not be concretised beyond the text of the treaty. Accordingly, it is fitting to 
conclude that the implicit anti-abuse rule is of subsidiary nature and may not be applied to a 
situation in which the contracting states have elected to apply a specific anti-abuse measure.155 
4.4  Inherent Anti-Abuse Principle 
Commentators156 have held that double taxation conventions contain an inherent anti-abuse 
principle, which they derive from article 26 and 31 VCLT. There is however no consensus on 
the question.157 The pacta sunt servanda principle, expressed by articles 26 and 31 VCLT, 
provides that “treaties are required to be complied with in accordance with the principle of good 
faith”, and thus should be understood as preventing abuse of treaties, the latter being deemed 
contrary to the VCLT.158  
                                                 
148 OECD Commentary 2014, para. 12 ad art. 10; OECD Commentary 2003, para. 12.1 ad art. 10. 
149 Conseil d’État, 13 October 1999, case no. 191191, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v. SA 
Diebold Courtage. 
150 CRC du 3 mars 2005 (SRK 2003-139), para. 3.d 
151 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 89. 
152 Art. 4(1) OECD MC. 
153 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 89. 
154 DANON, Le concept de bénéficiaire effectif, p. 40. 
155 DE BROE/VON FRENCKELL, La notion de « bénéficiaire effectif », p. 287. 
156 DANON, Cession transfrontalière de droits de participations, p. 136 et seq.; WARD, Abuse of Tax Treaties, p. 
180; dissenting: GANI, RDAF 2006 II 239, p. 254. 
157 DANON/DINH, La clause du bénéficiaire effectif, m.no. 144. 
158 WARD, Abuse of Tax Treaties, p. 178. 
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As of 2003, the OECD recognises an inherent anti-abuse principle in the form of the guiding 
principle: 
A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements 
was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable 
treatment in these circumstances would-be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions.159 
This guiding principle has been considered to be the origin of the PPT rule, which will be 
covered hereafter under section 8.3. 
Beneficial ownership and the inherent anti-abuse principle, if recognised, pose a problem of 
delimitation. Indeed, whether beneficial ownership or the anti-abuse principle, or both, should 
apply to certain situations is not entirely clear. Commentators disagree on whether the approach 
should be cumulative or subordinate.160  
Under the cumulative approach, the inherent anti-abuse principle is applicable concurrently 
with specific anti-abuse rules, such as the beneficial ownership test. Accordingly, this leads to 
a two-step process: if the application of the SAAR must be ruled out, the anti-abuse principle 
is then relevant to analyse the situation.161  
The subordinate approach gives the inherent anti-abuse principle a subsidiary nature. As such, 
when a specific anti-abuse rule is applicable, such as the beneficial ownership test, it should be 
considered that only that specific rule is relevant to cover the facts it is relevant for; in other 
words, if a subject matter falls under the scope of beneficial ownership, it may not be 
apprehended through the inherent anti-abuse principle.162 Moreover, Ward has argued that it is 
not possible to imply that the parties to a tax treaty intended the application of the inherent anti-
abuse if they have provided for a GAAR in the double taxation convention.163 The subordinate 
approach relies on a literal interpretation of tax treaties, as provided by article 31(1) VCLT.164 
 
                                                 
159 OECD Commentary 2003, para. 9.5. ad art. 1. 
160 DANON, La réserve non écrite de l’abus, m.no. 156. 
161 Ibid., m.no. 152. 
162 Ibid., m.no. 153. 
163 WARD, Abuse of Tax Treaties, p. 184; dissenting: OECD Commentary 2003, para. 9.6. ad art. 1. 
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4.5  Beneficial owner and Bénéficiaire effectif 
As both French and English are authentic languages of the OECD MC, as well as official 
languages of the OECD, comparing the terminology in both versions of the Model seems 
adequate. Some authors165 have argued that the French terminology, ‘bénéficiaire effectif’ better 
demonstrates the purpose of the concept under the OECD’s vision. ‘Bénéficiaire effectif’ has 
been translated to ‘real beneficiary’ or ‘effective beneficiary’,166 the former, although not literal, 
being, in my opinion, a better capture of the meaning.  
Moreover, ‘bénéficiaire effectif’, unlike the English term ‘beneficial owner’, does not imply 
ownership, which is interesting given how problematic the reference to ownership has been in 
interpreting the concept, especially outside of common law jurisdictions; the concerned courts 
being unfamiliar with beneficial ownership. Furthermore, the ‘idea of effectiveness’167 renders 
the literal interpretation of the Model’s wording much easier as it conveys the notion of 
effectiveness in the enjoyment of passive incomes. However, other authors have argued that 
‘bénéficiaire effectif’ is not a good translation of English.168 
Interestingly, Canada, a bilingual common law jurisdiction, has found different translations of 
beneficial ownership. In the Prévost case, the Tax Court of Canada mentioned that although 
‘beneficial owner’ corresponded to bénéficiaire effectif in the French language versions of tax 
treaties signed by Canada, Canadian domestic legislation used ‘propriété effective’ (effective 
or real ownership), ‘propriétaire effectif’ (effective or real owner), ‘personne ayant la propriété 
effective’ (person having the effective or real ownership) in its French versions. Furthermore, 
when dealing with trusts, Canadian legislation translated ‘beneficial ownership’ to ‘droit de 
bénéficiaire’ (beneficiary right).169 
As evidenced by the difficulties, even for bilingual common law jurisdiction,170 in finding an 
adequate and single translation to a term such as ‘beneficial ownership’ and with a meaning 
arduous to convey, the expression seems unfit for usage in an international tax treaty model. 
Indeed, tax treaties, although numerous in English, are not always provided in an authentic 
version in that sole language. Furthermore, the courts from whom interpretation is expected are 
                                                 
165 PISTONE, Beneficial Ownership as Anti-Abuse Provision, p. 177. 
166 KEMMEREN, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, m.no. 24. 
167 PISTONE, Beneficial Ownership as Anti-Abuse Provision, p. 177. 
168 VANN, Beneficial Ownership, p. 288, footnote 46. 
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not necessarily anglophone and perhaps even more importantly, often belong to other legal 
traditions. Lastly, the expression beneficial ownership has without doubt origins in common 
law171 and seems to be very firmly largely anchored as such in Anglo-Saxon legal minds, which 
has arguably led common law courts to construe beneficial ownership accordingly.172  
                                                 
171 See supra 2.4.2. 
172 See infra 7.1.1.3. 
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5 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN SWISS CASE LAW  
5.1  The Swiss Withholding Tax Regime 
The Swiss Federal Constitution provides that “the Confederation may levy a withholding tax173 
on income from moveable capital assets, on lottery winnings and on insurance benefits.”174 This 
withholding tax and its regulation are implemented in the Federal Act on Withholding Tax of 
13 October 1965175 (hereafter WHTA) and in the Ordinance on Withholding Tax of 19 
December 1966.176  
The Swiss withholding tax is considered to be ‘special income tax’177 by commentators.178 The 
mechanism of the withholding tax is designed to serve two alternative purposes:  
For Swiss residents who correctly inform tax authorities on their gross income, it aims to 
guarantee that income tax is paid and prevents tax evasion.179 Indeed, the levy of the 
withholding tax deters taxpayers from omitting taxed revenues on their tax sheet as failing to 
inform the tax authorities prevents a subsequent refund of the withholding tax, thus functioning 
as an incentive.180 
The other purpose of the Swiss withholding tax solely concerns non-resident recipients and is 
purely fiscal.181 Individuals not residing in Switzerland when the tax was due are normally not 
granted a refund of the withholding tax.182 However, under certain conditions, the tax may be 
fully or partially refunded to foreign residents under the benefit of a double tax convention 
signed between the beneficiary’s state of residence and Switzerland (i.e. the state of source).183 
Indeed, under the Swiss Constitution, treaty law supersedes domestic law (i.e. the WHTA). 
Legal persons and partnerships are entitled to a refund if they were incorporated in Switzerland 
                                                 
173 Verrechnungsteuer [de]; impôt anticipé [fr]; imposta preventive [it].  
174 Art. 132(2) FC. 
175 RS 642.21. 
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182 Art. 22(1) WHTA. 
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at the date of payment184 and may also be entitled to a full or partial refund of the withholding 
tax on the basis of a double taxation convention.185 
5.2  The X Holding ApS Case 
The two main issues reviewed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in this case186 were whether 
a Danish holding company was entitled to a refund of the Swiss withholding tax on dividends 
and whether an anti-abuse rule was applicable despite the Denmark-Switzerland double 
taxation convention not expressly providing for such a rule. 
X Holding ApS (hereafter X ApS), a Danish holding company acquired all the shares of W SA 
in December 1999. X ApS was wholly owned by a company resident of Guernsey (Y Ltd.), 
itself controlled by a corporation resident of Bermuda (A Ltd.).187 B., the only shareholder and 
general manager of A Ltd. was a resident of Bermuda. On 30 November 2000, W SA distributed 
dividends to X ApS. The Swiss withholding tax was levied on the amount.188  
Subsequently, X ApS distributed a dividend to Y Ltd. and filed for a withholding tax refund. 
The Swiss Federal Tax Administration denied the refund,189 holding that X ApS had no real 
activity in Denmark and was only incorporated to benefit from the Switzerland-Denmark 
double taxation convention of 1973.190 Indeed, at the time the tax treaty in question stipulated 
that the withholding tax rate in the state of source was 0 percent.191 The Federal Commission 
for Appeals in Tax Matters adopted a substance over form point of view and rejected X ApS’ 
appeal and upheld the Swiss Federal Tax Administration’s decision.192 
5.2.1.1  Particularities of the Switzerland-Denmark DTC 
At the time of the case and until the amendment of 22 November 2010,193 article 10(1) of the 
Switzerland-Denmark tax treaty provided that “dividends paid by a company which is a resident 
of a contracting State to a resident of another contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
                                                 
184 Art. 24(2) WHTA. 
185 JAUSSI et al., Rückerstattung der Verrechnungssteuer, p. 651. 
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other State (i.e the state of residence) [emphasis added]”.194 This provision was different from 
the OECD Model which does not attribute an exclusive taxing right on dividends to the state of 
residence of the beneficiary.195 Furthermore, this full relief was provided for in no other tax 
treaty ratified by Switzerland, which may have induced taxpayers to hold shares of a Swiss 
company through a Danish holding company for pure tax purposes.196 
5.2.1.2  Court’s Decision and Critical Remarks 
The Federal Supreme Court ruled that “in cases of abuse of double taxation conventions, treaty 
benefits may be denied even in the absence of a conventionally adopted, express anti-abuse 
provisions.”197 The Court further held that when the tax treaty is properly interpreted and 
pursuant to articles 26 and 31 of the VCLT, an inherent anti-abuse principle is apparent. More 
specifically, the FSC considered that the inherent anti-abuse principle is embodied in the 
principle of good faith. 
However, the court, mistook paragraph 9.4 to article 1 of the 2003 OECD Commentary198 as an 
expression of the international recognition of a prohibition of treaty abuse. Indeed, this section 
of the OECD Commentary is arguably an example of a provision that contracting states may 
wish to adopt; the Swiss and Danish authorities did not, however, include such a provision in 
the tax treaty. Some authors argued that the guiding principle199 should have been the basis of 
the FSC’s reasoning.200 Danon has further argued that the guiding principle codifies a general 
principle of prohibition of abuse of rights in tax treaties.201 
Moreover, the court considered that the OECD Commentaries were valid interpretation tools 
for double taxation conventions, even if adopted after the tax treaty’s entry into force. 
Commentators generally disagreed with the use of the 2003 OECD Commentary by the court 
as article 10 of the double taxation convention in question and article 10 OECD MC did not 
correspond.202 De Broe and von Frenckell203 have argued that the court used the OECD 
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Commentary without realising that Switzerland had expressed an observation indicating that 
the country did not share the view, expressed under paragraph 7, according to which the purpose 
of double taxation conventions is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.204 
The court considered that beneficial ownership, which was not denied to X ApS, did not 
preclude the application of the inherent anti-abuse principle.205 On the basis of the look-through 
approach, absent from the double taxation convention at stake, the FSC assessed X ApS’s 
financial statements and arrived at the conclusion that the company had no substance as it lacked 
employees and offices in Denmark. The court further held that there were no solid business 
reasons for the company’s creation other than benefiting from a withholding tax relief. 
5.3  Beneficial Ownership in Switzerland 
The Federal Supreme Court (hereafter FSC) is the supreme judicial authority of Switzerland.206 
Lacking a statutory definition of ‘beneficial ownership’, Swiss law relies on the FSC’s case law 
to construe the concept.  
5.3.1 The TRS Case 
In this case207 the FSC had to determine how to interpret beneficial ownership in a situation 
where Swiss equity dividends were hedged in derivatives transactions. 
5.3.1.1 Facts 
A Danish bank entered into total return swap (hereafter TRS) agreements over Swiss equities 
with other banks, acting as counterparties, located in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Germany and France.208 The conditions of the swap agreement were the following: the Danish 
bank would pay any appreciation of the shares and the dividends, corresponding to the duration 
of the term of the swaps, to its counterparties, who in return would pay any depreciation of the 
shares, as well as a market interest rate (LIBOR) plus a margin to the bank.209 
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To hedge its risk, the bank bought the underlying shares to the TRS from third party brokers; 
the swap agreement did not stipulate that the bank had to do so, nonetheless the bank was fully 
hedged.210 Upon dividend distribution, the bank made its payments to the counterparties and 
applied for a withholding tax refund under articles 10 and 26(2) of the Switzerland-Denmark 
DTC, which provided for an exemption in the state of source.211 Unlike dividends, the bank’s 
TRS payments were not subject to a Swiss withholding tax.212 The bank sold the underlying 
securities upon the TRS’s maturity. 
The tax authorities denied the withholding tax refund,213 arguing that the shares were 
systematically bought before and sold after dividend distribution dates, and that the 
transactions’ purpose was to transfer dividends to undisclosed counterparties net of the swiss 
withholding tax. Furthermore, the tax authorities claimed that the transactions were constitutive 
to treaty abuse as they were unusually important and solely driven by fiscal motives.214 
5.3.1.2 Federal Administrative Court’s Decision 
The FAC held that “the concept of beneficial ownership is merely a condition of entitlement 
like, say, the concept of residence, rather than a singular abuse clause”215 and cited the FSC’s 
case law to conclude that “[o]nly once all the conditions of entitlement under a DTC are met 
(including beneficial ownership) does the question of potential abuse of the convention 
arise.”216 Consequently, the court considered that the duration of the TRS and the ‘subjective 
motive’ of tax avoidance were irrelevant to the case.217 
The court followed the FSC’s conclusions of the X Holding ApS case and held that the 
Switzerland-Denmark double taxation convention is subject to an inherent anti-abuse 
principle.218 
Commentators have argued that if the FAC had ruled that tax avoidance prevention was relevant 
to interpret the concept of beneficial ownership, it would have had to investigate whether 
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legitimate commercial reasons explained why the bank had entered into the TRS, if the 
transaction were solely a means of evading withholding taxes and establish the normal market 
conditions for entering into comparable agreements.219 
The court adopted a narrow interpretation of beneficial ownership,220 and considered that: 
Regardless of whether it received the dividends, the complainant was obliged to pay 
the counterparty the amounts equivalent to the dividends. At the same time, the 
complainant was free to decide, independently of the swap contracts, whether to buy 
the shares in question and to receive the corresponding dividends. The lack of 
interdependence shows that the complainant did indeed have the power to decide how 
to use the dividends it received. The complainant therefore was under no de facto 
obligation to pass on the dividends. It was free to dispose of them as it wished and to 
use them for other purposes instead.221 
The court thus found that the bank had no obligation, legal or factual, to use the dividends to 
pay its counterparties, finding no interdependence in the transactions.222 Moreover, the FAC 
ruled out treaty abuse on the grounds that the bank was effectively headquartered in Denmark 
and engaged in genuine activity.223 The court decided in favour of the bank, ruling that it was 
the beneficial owner of the dividends.224 
5.3.1.3 Federal Supreme Court’s Decision and Critical Remarks 
On 5 May 2015, the FSC reversed the FAC’s judgment and denied the Danish bank’s refund 
claim. Like the FAC, the court found that the beneficial ownership criterion was indeed implicit 
in the Switzerland-Denmark DTC,225 thus confirming the 2006 X Holding ApS decision.226   
The court considered that establishing the purpose of beneficial ownership, i.e. whether it is 
designed to prevent abuse (broad interpretation) or not, was not necessary in the present case.227 
The FSC ruled that in the context of dividend payments, the key criterion to identify the 
beneficial owner is whether the person can fully dispose of the dividends, i.e. fully use and 
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benefit, without legal, contractual or factual limitations.228 According to Weidmann, the FSC 
assumed that beneficial ownership of dividends is distinct from beneficial ownership of 
shares.229 
The court held that “the German term [Nutzungsberechtiger] emphasises that beneficial 
ownership is not to be understood in a narrow technical or legalistic sense, but rather taking 
into account the economic circumstances”230 and that “this [reasoning] applies therefore for any 
restrictions of the entitlement. Although an obligation limiting full use generally results from 
legal documents, it may also be based on facts or circumstances from which it appears that the 
recipient does not enjoy the full power to dispose and full beneficial ownership.”231 A limitation 
of control can thus result from legal obligations that restrict the right to enjoy dividends or from 
restrictions resulting from facts and circumstances.  
The court somewhat addressed the purpose of beneficial ownership, finding that “it is designed 
to prevent a person or company with only limited powers [from] being interposed as an 
intermediary in order to benefit from the benefits of the double taxation convention”232 and that 
“it is irrelevant whether the interposition of an intermediary in another state actually results in 
a tax benefit.”233 This excerpt has proven to be critical; Swiss courts have denied beneficial 
ownership to taxpayers despite there being no apparent fiscal gain.234  
The court considered that the receipt of dividends, from an economic perspective, was linked 
with the contractual obligation to pay the counterparties to the swap, to the extent that a de facto 
obligation to transfer dividends could be assumed. Consequently, there was interdependence 
between the reception of dividends by the bank and the payments made to the counterparties. 
Indeed, the shares were systematically purchased before dividend maturity, to pass on dividends 
net of Swiss withholding tax to the counterparties outside of the contracting states (i.e. Denmark 
and Switzerland). The bank itself admitted that the counterparties were residents in states whose 
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tax treaties with Switzerland provided for a less advantageous residual withholding tax of 15 
percent. 235 
Several questions were raised by the FSC’s judgment. The first one is whether beneficial 
ownership could be regarded as implicit in the Switzerland-Denmark double taxation 
convention. The court mentioned that most Swiss commentators236 agreed with the implicit 
nature of beneficial ownership in tax treaties237 and considered that the criterion was implicitly 
present in the treaty at stake.238 The court based its reasoning on the 2009 amending Protocol 
to the Switzerland-Denmark double taxation convention of 1973,239 which, inter alia, 
introduced the term ‘beneficial owner’ in the treaty. However, the withholding tax refund 
claims of the Danish bank were anterior to the conclusion and entry into force of the Protocol. 
Furthermore, the double taxation convention of 1973, was adopted before the introduction of 
beneficial ownership in the OECD MC. To remedy with this incoherence, the court argued that 
the Protocol was a ‘mere clarification’ of the treaty, but not a real change or new criterion. This 
view is coherent with the OECD Commentary of 2014.240  
In my opinion, this reasoning is contradictory if the introduction of beneficial ownership in 
1977 is considered to have been a way to prevent a specific form of abuse, i.e. treaty shopping. 
Indeed, if the concept is of such importance, it cannot be asserted that it is a mere clarification 
of ‘paid to’, especially not in a treaty predating the introduction of the notion in the OECD 
Model. Moreover, the FSC interpreted a 1973 tax treaty under the OECD Commentary of 2014, 
without explaining why the interpretation of an earlier treaty with a later OECD Commentary 
was possible.241 Some commentators have argued that beneficial ownership should only be 
considered in the Switzerland-Denmark double taxation convention if the case at stake occurs 
after the entry into force of the amendment of article 10.242 Based on the Swiss government’s 
message which accompanied the Protocol of 2009, Gani considers that the introduction in the 
treaty of an express anti-abuse rule which provides that the tax relief is contingent on being the 
beneficial owner, was an admittance of a pre-existing loophole.243 Indeed, if, as the FSC 
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interprets it, the beneficial owner criterion was implicit in the treaty, it was unnecessary to 
amend the treaty to expressly introduce it. In any case, the government’s message should have 
expressly mentioned that although the concept was formally introduced by the Protocol, it did 
not constitute a new criterion.244 
The second, and most important issue in the case is the alleged interdependence between the 
receipt of dividends by the Danish bank and the passing on of the dividends to swap 
counterparties under the TRS agreement. Indeed, the interdependence between both 
transactions was the primary reason for the FSC’s conclusion that the bank was not the 
beneficial owner of the dividends. 
The definition of beneficial ownership employed by the court was first suggested by 
Baumgartner.245 The court explained this commentator’s view as follows: 
[B]eneficial ownership is to be affirmed if the recipient of the relevant income is able 
not only to make very limited decisions but, as a minimum, is able to make at least 
certain decisions independently. This power of decision must be denied to a person 
when the said person must pass on the earnings on the basis of contractual obligations 
entered into before the date of payment or of [f]actual restrictions. The existence of [a] 
[f]actual restriction is to be assumed when both of the following characteristics have 
been cumulatively fulfilled. On the one hand, obtaining of income must depend on this 
obligation to pass on these earnings, on the other hand, the obligation to pass an 
income must depend on this income being obtained.246 
Under this conception there are two cumulative criteria for the existence of a factual limitation: 
The first dependency is that the realisation of the income depends on the duty to forward this 
income upon the obligation to transfer the income. The second dependency is that the duty to 
forward the income depends on the realisation of the income.247 
It follows, that a factual restriction can be presumed if there is an interdependence between the 
reception of dividends and the obligation to pass on the dividends. The FSC considers that “[i]n 
relation to the scope of the passing on, the following rule is applied: The greater the dependence 
between income and obligation to pass it on, the weaker the beneficial ownership.”248  
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Consequently, the court stated that the recipient passing on the dividend in full or being obliged 
to do so evidenced a lack of ‘power of disposal’. However, the court disagreed with authors249 
according to whom beneficial ownership could be ascertained if a recipient does not transfer 
the totality of the received income to a non-resident party, namely arguing that this was even 
more so when the difference was a small percentage attributable to remuneration or 
compensation for forwarding the income.250 This point of view has had some support amongst 
commentators.251  
The court concluded its decision by comparing the situation of the Danish bank to a stepping-
stone arrangement. Indeed, under the swap agreements, 100 percent of the distributed 
dividends, i.e. net of withholding tax, were to be passed on to the counterparties. Moreover, the 
passed-on dividends were deductible expenses for the bank. The FSC thus considers that 
beneficial ownership should not only be denied to agents, nominees and conduit companies but 
also when a transaction somewhat resembles a stepping-stone arrangement.252 This argument 
has been criticised.253  
5.3.2 Federal Administrative Court’s Case Law 
The Federal Administrative Court (hereafter FAC) is the judicial authority to which decisions 
of the Swiss Federal Tax Authority in matters of withholding tax can be appealed.254 The 
decisions of the FAC can, as previously mentioned, be appealed to the FSC. However, three 
judgments255 on beneficial ownership were not appealed by the taxpayers, thus entering into 
force, and, as of today256 another three Federal Administrative Court judgments257 also relating 
to beneficial ownership are still pending appeal before the Federal Supreme Court. Since the 
landmark decision of 5 May 2015, in which its reasoning was reversed,258 the FAC has 
thoroughly followed the FSC’s understanding of Baumgartner’s interdependence theory and 
                                                 
249 DANON, Le concept de bénéficiaire effectif, p. 46; BAUMGARTNER, Das Konzept des beneficial owner, p. 142 
et seq. 
250 FSC Judgment of 5 May 2015, ATF 141 II 447, para. 5.2.4, inofficial translation by Walder Wyss AG. 
251 DE BROE/VON FRENCKELL, La notion de « bénéficiaire effectif » et la question de l’abus de convention, p. 273. 
252 WEIDMANN, Swiss Swaps case, p. 633. 
253 Ibid., pp. 634-635. 
254 Art. 42 WHTA. 
255 FAC Judgment of 26 May 2016, A-1245/2011; FAC Judgment of 7 July 2016, A-1103/2011 and FAC Judgment 
of 31 August 2016, A-5692/2015. 
256 31 December 2017. 
257 FAC decision of 20 December 2016, A-1426/2011; FAC decision of 31 January 2017, A-2122/2016 and FAC 
decision of 25 September 2017, A-3061/2015. 
258 See supra 5.3.1.2. 
39 
 
applied it to a series of cases involving financial instruments which were suspended in 
expectation of the Total Return Swap and SMI Index Futures decisions. 
5.4  Conclusion: Beneficial Ownership in Switzerland 
Since the 2015 landmark Total Return Swap decision, Switzerland has followed a broad 
substance oriented approach of beneficial ownership. This case law has since been confirmed 
in several judgments.259 These decisions assess beneficial ownership through economic control, 
focusing on the criterion of interdependence between the income and the obligation to transfer 
the income to a non-resident, whether this obligation is a legal one or simply observed from 
facts, i.e. circumstances. This conception of beneficial ownership does not incorporate a 
subjective element, such as the intention of the taxpayer or his motives in entering an 
arrangement, and is thus purely objective. Consequently, a distinction is made in the FSC’s case 
law between beneficial ownership and the general prohibition of abuse, the latter including both 
an objective and subjective element.260  
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6 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Beneficial ownership was added as a criterion in two EU directives: the EU Interest and 
Royalties Directive and the now repealed Savings Directive.261 Most authors argue for an 
autonomous EU law meaning of beneficial ownership in the Interest and Royalties Directive.262 
However, it has been argued that beneficial ownership as defined in the directive could help 
assess beneficial ownership in a treaty context.263 Indeed, primary and secondary (such as 
directives) EU law qualify as international law and thus fall under the scope of article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT and could, therefore, be applied in treaty context unless the context requires otherwise.264  
There are currently265 seven Danish cases266 on beneficial ownership pending before the 
European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ). The numerous preliminary questions submitted to 
the ECJ include questions on whether beneficial ownership as provided for in the Interest and 
Royalty Directive should be interpreted according to the article 11 OECD MC and the OECD 
Commentary, and if yes which version (1977 or more recent). 
6.1  Interest and Royalty Directive 
This directive exempts royalties and interest payments of source taxes between parent 
companies in the EU, under the condition that the recipient is the ‘beneficial owner’ of the 
income.267 Article 1(4) indicates that the company qualifies as the beneficial owner “only if it 
receives those payments for its own benefit and not as an intermediary, such as an agent, trustee 
or authorised signatory, for some other person.” Article 1(5) provides for the treatment of a 
permanent establishment as the beneficial owner of interest or royalties, which is contingent on 
the permanent establishment being subject to tax on the income it claims beneficial ownership 
of. Beneficial ownership as understood in this directive is a term of EU law.268  
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6.2  Savings Directive 
The Savings Directive has been repealed by a new directive269 which covers many of the aspects 
previously dealt with by the Savings Directive, but no longer contains a definition of beneficial 
ownership. 
6.3  Savings Agreement 
In the context of the Bilateral Agreements II, Switzerland and the EU have ratified an agreement 
on the taxation of savings270 (hereafter Savings Agreement), which entered into force on 1 July 
2005. Following a Protocol adopted on 27 May 2015, the Agreement was renamed and almost 
completely amended,271 to cover the automatic exchange of information according to the OECD 
standard and to continue the exemption of withholding taxes on dividend, interest and royalty 
cross-border payments between affiliated companies.272 
In its previous versions, the Agreement implemented, inter alia, a retention273 (i.e. withholding 
tax) on interest payments outbound from Switzerland to residents of a EU member state, 
provided that they qualified as ‘beneficial owners’. The term ‘beneficial owner’ was used in 
several provisions of the Agreement.274 The Treaty was authenticated in 19 languages,275 the 
French terminology that was employed matched the OECD’s (i.e. bénéficiaire effectif), the 
German and Italian versions also corresponded to the translations of the term ‘beneficial owner’ 
that have been used in double taxation conventions ratified by OECD member states.276 
Under the previous version of the Agreement, the beneficial owner of the interest was the 
individual who received or secured an interest payment for his own benefit.277 Pursuant to 
article 4(1) of the Agreement, the individual did not qualify as the beneficial owner if he acted 
as a paying agent,278 or acted on behalf of a legal person, investment fund or similar body for 
common investments in securities,279 or acted on behalf of another individual who was the 
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beneficial owner and who disclosed their identity and state of residence to the paying agent.280 
The definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ was considered specific to the agreement and not 
necessarily applicable to the definition of the term as found in double taxation conventions.281  
Moreover, article 15 of the Savings Agreement, which dealt with intercompany dividends, 
interest and royalties – thus granting Switzerland measures equivalent to those found in the EU 
directives – did not expressly require the parent company to be the beneficial owner of the 
outbound income. This provision did not stop more favourable provisions in double taxation 
conventions binding Switzerland and a EU member state from being applicable.282 
Whether ‘beneficial ownership’, as understood in the Agreement, was to be applied to this 
provision was controversial. Based on teleological interpretation some commentators283 
supported that beneficial ownership was applicable to article 15 because the concept was 
suitable to prevent ‘directive shopping’. Others disagreed,284 arguing that the wording of article 
15 did not include the term ‘beneficial owner’ and that considering it to be implicit is contrary 
to article 31(1) VCLT, which provides for the interpretation of treaties in good faith.285  
This issue remains of importance, as contrary to all the provisions that explicitly mentioned 
beneficial ownership, article 15 has not been repealed by the Protocol of 27 May 2015, but 
simply renumbered (article 9). Under the new treaty, entered into force 1st January 2017, 
Switzerland no longer proceeds to a treaty based retention on outbound interests. Article 9(3) 
of the amended agreement still provides that tax treaties between a EU member state and 
Switzerland are applicable if they are more favourable. 
Although it can be argued that there is no room for an implicit ‘beneficial ownership’ condition 
in the treaty since the term no longer appears explicitly in other provisions of the amended 
agreement, it must be considered that the Savings Agreement implements EU law in 
Switzerland-EU relations. Consequently, it cannot be excluded that the European Court of 
Justice (hereafter ECJ) may find an implicit beneficial ownership condition in the revised 
Agreement. Although the decisions of the ECJ are not binding for Switzerland, Swiss courts 
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must take into consideration the ECJ’s case law on matters relating to the Savings 
Agreement.286 
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7 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy have all had landmark cases relating to 
beneficial ownership. These jurisdictions are all OECD members, yet they have interpreted and 
construed the concept in various ways with different outcomes. 
7.1  Canada 
In 2007, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal ruled287 that a domestic general anti-avoidance 
rule was inapplicable to a treaty shopping case.288 The court also denied the existence of an 
inherent anti-abuse principle.289 The loss of this case prompted the Canadian tax authorities to 
change their strategy and challenge treaty shopping arrangements involving passive income by 
considering that the recipient of the payment was not the beneficial owner.290 This strategy was 
first employed in the Prévost case. 
7.1.1 The Prévost Case 
This case291 was of major importance internationally as it was the first common law decision to 
directly address beneficial ownership in a tax treaty context. Indeed, the previous Indofood 
decision in the United Kingdom was not an actual tax treaty case but a contract case in which 
tax law had implications.292  
7.1.1.1 Facts 
The issue, in this case, was whether Prévost Holding BV (hereafter PHBV), a holding company 
resident of the Netherlands was the beneficial owner of dividends paid by its wholly owned 
subsidiary Prévost Car Inc., incorporated in Quebec, Canada. The Minister of National Revenue 
(hereafter Minister) argued that the shareholders of PHBV, Volvo (a resident of Sweden) and 
Henlys (a resident of the United Kingdom), were the beneficial owners of the dividends, i.e. 
that PHBV was not the beneficial owner of the dividends, which meant that article 10(2) of the 
Canada-Netherlands tax treaty was not applicable. 
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The identity of the beneficial owner was critical: Canadian domestic law293 provided that 
companies distributing dividends overseas were required to withhold and remit 25 percent of 
the amounts paid.294 The reduced tax rates in the Canadian tax treaties with Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, applicable if the shareholders were considered beneficial owners,295 were, 
respectively, 15 and 10 percent. However, under article 10(2) of the Canada-Netherlands double 
taxation convention, the withholding tax rate was set at 5 percent, a substantial difference, 
which probably explains why PHBV was incorporated in the Netherlands by its shareholders 
(the appellants claimed that the Netherlands was chosen as a compromise between Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, and that tax considerations were present but secondary).296 
Both shareholders of PHBV had signed a shareholders’ agreement, which provided, amongst 
other things, that at least 80 percent of the profits of Prévost, PHBV and any possible 
subsidiaries were to be distributed to the shareholders.297 The distribution of profits was subject 
to the structure having sufficient financial resources to operate unless the shareholders agreed 
otherwise.298 PHBV was not a party to this agreement.299 
Furthermore, PHBV had no employees, its only assets were the shares of Prévost Car, and its 
office in the Netherlands was in the office of a management company affiliated with the holding 
company’s bank;300 in other words, PHBV had no substance. 
7.1.1.2  Court’s Decision 
The Tax Court began by comparing the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty to the OECD Model and 
essentially observed that article 10 of the treaty was almost identical to the wording of the 1997 
version of the OECD Model.301 The various translations of beneficial ownership found in the 
French versions of Canadian domestic legislation were also mentioned but not relevant as 
‘bénéficiaire effectif’ was used in the concerned tax treaties.302  
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A definition of ‘beneficial owner’ was given by the judge: 
[…] the “beneficial owner” of dividends is the person who receives the dividends for 
his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he 
or she received. The person who is beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who 
enjoy and assumes all the attribute of ownership [emphasis added]. In short, the 
dividend is for the owner’s own benefit and this person is not accountable to anyone 
for how he or she deals with the dividend income […].303  
However, the court also found that certain conduit companies were barred from beneficial 
ownership. Indeed, the decision mentions that a holding company is the beneficial owner of 
dividends paid to it unless there is strong evidence of tax avoidance or treaty abuse.304 The court 
also held that:  
Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of a nominee, one 
looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatory is acting or for whom the 
nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate entities are concerned, one does not 
pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another person and 
has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put through it as 
conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else's behalf pursuant to that person’s 
instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for 
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for clients.305 
Consequently, the court ruled in favour of the taxpayer, deciding that PHBV was the beneficial 
owner of the dividends paid by Prévost Car Inc.,306 as it owned the Prévost shares and there was 
no evidence that PHBV acted as a conduit, 307 an agent or a nominee for Volvo and Henlys.308 
The Minister appealed the Tax Court’s decision, arguing that ‘beneficial owner’ should “mean 
the person who can, in fact, ultimately benefit from the dividend [emphasis added]”.309 The 
decision was upheld310 by the Federal Court of Appeal because no support for the Minister’s 
argument could be found in OECD documentation (the 1997 and 2003 OECD Commentaries 
on article 10 and the Conduit Companies Report of 1987).311 
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7.1.1.3  Critical remarks 
The outcome and reasoning of the court in the Prévost case have been subject to much debate. 
The court deviated from the Indofood case and preferred a legal rather than economic approach 
in interpreting the term ‘beneficial owner’.312 Indeed, as the shareholders’ agreement did not 
bind the Dutch holding company, which meant that there was no predetermined or automated 
cash flow, the court did not consider PHBV to be a conduit company.313 Only legal 
circumstances were considered to assess beneficial ownership. 
Although the Dutch holding company lacked substance, the court correctly asserted that 
beneficial ownership was not dependent on substance requirements.314  Furthermore, the court 
held that “an intermediary holding company should as a matter of principle, be regarded as the 
beneficial owner of the income it receives.”315 This consideration is essential as not all holding 
companies are illegitimate nor are they systematically conduit companies. 
However, the court did somewhat insist on the attributes of ownership,316 an understanding of 
beneficial ownership which is not exactly that of the OECD material. Some commentators argue 
that beneficial ownership was perceived as an attribution-of-income rule by the court.317 The 
Court, in accordance with previous Canadian case law,318 and unlike other jurisdictions,319 did 
not consider the application of a GAAR.320  
Despite the Canadian Supreme Court having previously held321 that the ‘beneficial owner’ was 
the person who could ‘ultimately’ exercise the rights of ownership in the property, the court did 
not strip away the corporate veil, i.e. consider the shareholders of a company to be the beneficial 
owners of corporate assets.322 This is important as beneficial ownership should not be 
assimilated to ‘ultimate’ ownership.323 
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Commentators do not agree on whether the Prévost case is an example of giving beneficial 
ownership an international meaning based on the context of the treaty or a domestic meaning; 
the court did not clearly address the question.324 Indeed, the judge mentioned that article 3(2) 
of the tax treaty required him “to look to a domestic solution in interpreting beneficial owner” 
but further stated that the OECD Commentary of 1977 on article 10(2) was also relevant.325 
Kemmeren argues that the extensive reference by the judge to OECD documentation, which 
based the decision, despite Canadian and Dutch law also being referred to, shows that the court 
gave beneficial ownership an international meaning.326 However, Arnold argues that article 3(2) 
of the Netherlands-Canada double taxation convention led the court to consider the meaning of 
beneficial ownership under Canadian laws, and that even though  article 10 OECD MC, Dutch 
law, and the Indofood case were also considered, the “decision was fundamentally based on the 
meaning under Canadian law.”327 This author considers the application of domestic law 
unsurprising as Canadian courts are more familiar with it.328 Some authors consider that the 
court seems to have been strongly influenced by the Dutch perspective, according to experts, 
that PHBV was the beneficial owner of the dividends.329 Finally, the Federal Court of Appeal 
in its decision upholding the Tax Court’s judgment considers that the OECD material was the 
basis for the lower courts findings. 
The Prévost case is undoubtedly amongst the most important decisions on beneficial ownership. 
In my opinion this is imputable to two reasons: the case was the first330 common law judgment 
to address the meaning of beneficial ownership and it was also the first major decision to rely 
on international tax expert witnesses.331 
Policy-wise, the Prévost case is unusual. In 1993, before the decision, the Canada-Netherlands 
tax treaty was amended, reducing the source taxation on dividends from 10 to 5 percent. Arnold 
argues that the Canadian authorities had to be aware that the lowered rate, compared to other 
European countries, provided by the treaty would encourage investors to use Dutch holding 
companies for investments in Canadian companies.332 Despite all this, no limitation-of-benefits 
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rule or anti-treaty shopping provision was included in the amended treaty. The author concludes 
that the result of the Prévost case is thus coherent from a policy point of view.333 Furthermore, 
Canada, unlike other countries,334 did not amend the concerned treaty after the decision. 
Moreover, the tax treaty between Sweden (where Volvo was resident) and Canada was amended 
in 2003,335 after the Prévost decision, and the source tax levied on dividends reduced from 10 
to 5 percent, which demonstrates that the Canadian government chose this treaty policy in full 
awareness of the applicable case law. 
There is a consensus that Canadian case law sets a very low threshold for beneficial ownership 
in tax treaty practice.336 Indeed, only agents, nominees and conduit companies are denied 
beneficial ownership. Moreover, holding companies are only considered conduits if they have 
“absolutely no discretion as to the use of the received funds.”337  
The Prévost precedent was confirmed in the Velcro case,338 in which the tax authorities chose 
not to appeal the decision.339 
7.2  United Kingdom: The Indofood Case 
This decision340 of the English Court of Appeal initiated a new phase in the discussion of the 
meaning of beneficial ownership.341 Indeed, the case was the first judgment on beneficial 
ownership, as understood in tax treaties, in the United Kingdom. Although the court analysed, 
inter alia, the OECD Commentary, the case was not a tax dispute but commercial litigation. 
It must be noted that the Indofood case is quite extraordinary. Firstly, the issue was a civil law 
matter,342 Indonesia being a civil law jurisdiction; secondly, the judges and counsel had no 
expertise in tax law and finally the issue at stake before the English court was the treatment of 
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a subsidiary under Indonesian law. Moreover, under English law, foreign law is a matter of fact 
and not law, and thus has a probative nature.343 
7.2.1 Facts 
Indofood, an Indonesian company, wanted to raise a sizeable loan which would be syndicated 
amongst lenders in the United Kingdom. Indonesian domestic law provided for a 20 percent 
withholding tax at the time, however, this tax was reduced to 10 percent under the Indonesia-
Mauritius tax treaty of 1996. Indofood incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary in Mauritius. 
This subsidiary had the sole purpose of granting a loan to its parent company, Indofood. The 
Mauritian entity then borrowed money from lenders and in turn lent the borrowed amounts to 
Indofood. The net interest rates344 on the loans and the borrowed amounts were identical  
between both entities and the British lenders.  
According to the Court of Appeal, the loan documentation prevented the Mauritian subsidiary 
from doing anything with the interest it received from Indofood. Moreover, evidence submitted 
to the court indicated that the subsidiary was ignored for income flows; the payments went 
directly from Indofood to the trustee and collecting agent of the lenders, JP Morgan. 
Indonesia terminated its double taxation convention with Mauritius, effective 1st January 2005. 
As a result, the applicable withholding tax rate to the interest payments from Indofood to its 
Mauritian subsidiary would revert to 20 percent.345 At this time, market conditions were 
advantageous for Indofood to terminate the loan agreement, to take a new loan with lower 
interest.346  
The loan agreement stipulated that Indofood could end the agreement (i.e. repay the loan early) 
if disadvantageous changes to the Indonesian or Mauritian tax laws occurred unless ‘such an 
obligation’ (i.e. additional taxes) could be avoided by taking ‘reasonable measures’.347 
Indofood, keen to reimburse its loan early argued that there were no possible reasonable 
measures. Conversely, JP Morgan, acting as trustee for the syndicated lenders, believed that a 
reasonable alternative arrangement was possible in the form of the incorporation of a Dutch 
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subsidiary by Indofood, which could obtain treaty benefits under the Netherlands-Indonesia 
double taxation convention. 
The parties had agreed to submit disputes to English courts. The presented issue was whether 
the interposition of a subsidiary in the Netherlands, taking the role of the Mauritian subsidiary, 
would be entitled to treaty benefits under the applicable tax treaty. The question was specifically 
whether the Netherland resident subsidiary would be the beneficial owner of the received 
interest. 
7.2.2 Court’s Decision 
The High Court Chancery Division found that Newco, the envisaged Netherlands subsidiary, 
would qualify as the beneficial owner of the interest. This decision was appealed and reversed 
by the Court of Appeal. The parties did not appeal the judgment before the House of Lords. 
The Court of Appeal found that “the term “beneficial owner” is to be given an international 
fiscal meaning not derived from the domestic laws of contracting states.”348 The court reached 
this conclusion by referring to the Conduit Companies Report, the OECD Commentary, a 
Commentary by Philip Baker and guidance provided by Indonesian tax authorities. The judge 
further held that “the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the formal 
owner who does not have “the full privilege to directly benefit from the income” and added that 
the emphasised quote was found in a circular letter of the Indonesian tax authorities.349 Baker 
has commented that it is not entirely clear what the quote from the circular means, but argues 
that “there is a clear emphasis on the beneficial owner having rights to enjoy the benefit of the 
income.”350  
The court then considered the facts of the case and concluded that the proposed Dutch 
subsidiary would not be the beneficial owner of the interest. Indeed, the parent company had 
taken the habit of bypassing its Mauritian subsidiary and paid its interest directly to the lenders. 
Moreover, Indofood had given a payment guarantee to the lenders.351 Furthermore, the 
subsidiary would have been obligated to make interest payments on precise days; Newco would 
have been bound to pay what it received from its parent company, to the principal paying agent 
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(JP Morgan). As such Newco did not directly benefit from the income.352 The Court of Appeal 
added that “the meaning to be given to the phrase ‘beneficial owner’ is plainly not to be limited 
by so technical and legal approach. Regard is to be had to the substance of the matter.”353  
Furthermore, the fact that the Indonesian tax authorities had never contested that the Mauritian 
subsidiary was the beneficial owner of the interest was not decisive as it did not necessarily 
follow that an Indonesian tax court would have reached the same conclusion.354 
7.2.3 Critical Remarks 
The judgment clearly states that the term ‘beneficial owner’ has an international fiscal meaning 
and not one found in the domestic law of states bound by the double taxation convention. Baker 
argues that this shows that the judgment is relevant to situations beyond Indonesian law. This 
author does, however, concede that the decision concluded more specifically that under 
Indonesian law beneficial ownership would have an international fiscal meaning.355 Moreover, 
countries with a definition of beneficial ownership in their legislation could interpret article 
3(2) OECD MC as the basis for a domestic law meaning of beneficial ownership. Nonetheless, 
most commentators agree that the court did in fact give beneficial ownership an international 
fiscal meaning.356 
The Court of Appeal decided that beneficial ownership had an international fiscal meaning, but 
it did not address the question of how the meaning of the term should be found. A hint is 
however given, as the court resorted to OECD material and publications by commentators, as 
well as Indonesian tax documentation, although the latter merely confirmed the former.357 
The judgment has been criticised because of the importance the court placed on the obligation 
to forward interest payments.358 Moreover, that the subsidiary is required “to have full privilege 
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to directly benefit from the income” is controversial. Indeed, establishing when one has full 
privilege of an income proves difficult.359 
De Broe and von Frenckell regret that the court used OECD material which was posterior to 
the Netherlands-Indonesia tax treaty, arguing in favour of a static interpretation of the OECD 
Commentary.360 They also argue that the structure, both pre-existent and envisaged by the 
lenders, was fictitious as the taxpayers themselves did not respect the consequences of the 
arrangement, i.e. the Mauritius subsidiary was bypassed for the sake of interest payments. 
According to both commentators, such fictitious arrangements should not entitle to treaty 
benefits;361 it follows that, under this conception, the Court of Appeal should not have even 
considered the application of a double taxation convention. 
When considering the Indofood case, the realisation that the facts at stake were atypical is 
essential. It is arguable that the Court of Appeal would have held different conclusions had the 
situation been different. The sole function of the subsidiary was to receive and pay interest; 
according to the court there was nothing it could do with the interest but forward it. Moreover, 
the subsidiary had no way of raising funds, to pay the interest, other than the ones it received 
from its parent. Baker has argued that had the facts been less extreme the Court of Appeal might 
have concluded otherwise than it did.362 
7.3  Spain: The Real Madrid Cases 
As most civil law jurisdictions, Spain does not have a statutory definition of beneficial 
ownership.363 Spanish courts have followed other jurisdictions and considered beneficial 
ownership to be a broad anti-abuse rule.364 
7.3.1 Facts 
The Real Madrid cases365 refer to several judgments in which the Audiencia Nacional (hereafter 
AN) had to deal with structures used by a Spanish football club. The structures involved 
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Hungarian companies and the payment of royalties for image rights on some of the club’s 
players. The Hungarian companies, recipients of the royalties, would then proceed to transfer 
the received income to companies in the Netherlands and Cyprus.366  
More precisely, a Hungarian company would only keep between 2 and 0.5 percent of the paid 
royalties, and would almost immediately, within a day after reception of the payments, transfer 
the rest of the income. Furthermore, there were no invoices between the Hungarian companies 
and the Dutch and Cypriot companies, yet the payments were still executed. Finally, the 
contracts between the Hungarian company, the club and the companies resident of the 
Netherlands and Cyprus were not dated coherently, nor did the amounts stated in the contracts 
systematically match those that were paid.367  
The Hungarian resident companies were key to the structure; the double taxation convention 
between Spain and Hungary was one of only two Spanish tax treaties which provided for a full 
exemption of royalties in the state of source.368 
The issue at stake was whether the Hungarian company receiving royalties, which it then 
forwarded, could be considered to be the ‘beneficial owner’ of said royalties under article 12 of 
the Hungary-Spain double taxation convention of 1984. 
7.3.2 Court’s Decision  
In its judgments the AN held that the main purpose of the concept of ‘beneficial owner’ is to 
prevent treaty shopping.369 Furthermore, the court considers beneficial ownership to be a clause 
providing for a large anti-treaty shopping effect. The meaning and consequence of beneficial 
ownership were deemed to correspond to a Spanish domestic statutory general anti-abuse 
clause.370 Consequently, the court concluded that the beneficial ownership requirement allowed 
the source state to ignore article 12 (royalties) of the Hungary-Spain tax treaty of 1984 in a 
situation where avoidance was present, without a domestic law procedure being necessary.371 
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The AN further considered that the term ‘beneficial owner’ has an international autonomous 
meaning. The court excluded that beneficial ownership could have a domestic law meaning by 
using article 3(2) OECD MC, which provides for such an exception when ‘the context otherwise 
requires’.372 Martín Jiménez argues that the court held that ‘beneficial ownership’ has an 
international autonomous meaning by mistake. Indeed, the AN followed the evolution of the 
concept in the OECD Model, the Commentaries and the Conduit Companies Report. However, 
in doing so, the court considered that the 2003 modifications of articles 10, 11, and 12 OECD 
MC and Commentary confirmed “the clear goal of the concept of beneficial ownership, i.e., its 
function as a wide anti-treaty shopping device aimed at tackling any form of treaty 
shopping.”373 Martín Jiménez, although disagreeing with this understanding of beneficial 
ownership, does not contest the result of the decisions.374 Kemmeren has argued that the AN 
was not mistaken375 as the OECD 2012 Discussion Draft suggest that beneficial ownership was 
introduced to prevent some forms of tax avoidance that the term ‘recipient’ could not prevent.376 
In essence, the court held that after the 2003 amendments, an economic interpretation is 
sufficient to determine the ‘real owner’ of an income;377 the AN thus disregarded legal 
ownership of the asset generating the income and focused on the relation between the recipient 
(i.e. the Hungarian companies) and the income. Martín Jiménez considers that the court goes 
so far as to assimilate ‘beneficial ownership’ to a ‘business purpose test’.378 Under this 
conception beneficial ownership requires a business rationale for having an entity between the 
payer of the income and the final recipient; the goal of reducing withholding taxes is not 
considered a business rationale.379 
The court did not analyse the legal power of the Hungarian conduits on the received income. It 
was simply assumed that the immediate transfer of the amounts to the Dutch and Cypriot 
companies showed that there was no control on the income.380  
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7.3.3 Critical Remarks 
There is no doubt that the Hungarian entities were conduit companies, and as such the outcome 
of the Real Madrid cases is not problematic. However, the reasoning of the court and the 
arguments of the tax authorities are not correct. Numerous tax authorities have used beneficial 
ownership as a way of countering treaty abuse when GAARs were not applicable (e.g. in the 
Prévost case); this was not necessary in the present cases. Indeed, the authorities and the court 
could have considered the Hungarian conduits to be nominees or agents, which would have 
sufficed to deny treaty benefits.381 Spanish courts seem to have followed other jurisdictions in 
considering beneficial ownership to be a broad anti-avoidance rule. 
Furthermore, the court based its reasoning on OECD publications, or rather their modifications, 
which were posterior to the Spain-Hungary double taxation convention of 1984 (i.e. the 2003 
OECD Commentary and the Conduit Companies Report of 1987).382 The fact that the AN did 
not explain why this documentation was relevant to the case, although this position has been 
defended by commentators, is arguably regrettable.  
7.3.4 Other Spanish Case Law 
In more recent cases, Spanish courts refused to apply the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to a Dutch 
holding company, arguing that it lacked a valid economic reason (although it had substance), 
but considered the Spain-Netherlands double taxation convention to be applicable to dividends 
paid by the Spanish subsidiary.383 These decisions did not address beneficial ownership, as the 
treaty in question did not contain such a clause. It follows that Spanish courts do not consider 
beneficial ownership to be implicit to tax treaties. Arguing that the court would not have applied 
the treaty if it had not considered that the income was attributable to the holding company, 
Martín Jiménez notes that this is an occurrence of beneficial ownership being interpreted more 
narrowly than a domestic anti-abuse rule.384 
7.4  France 
Two landmark decisions regarding beneficial ownership were issued by France’s supreme 
administrative court, the Conseil d’État: the Diebold Courtage case and the Bank of Scotland 
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case. Although undefined, the concept of beneficial ownership appears in French tax treaties as 
well as in some domestic provisions on international taxation.385 
7.4.1 The Diebold Case 
The Diebold case386 was the first important French decision on beneficial ownership.387 
Although its importance has since been limited, it was among the first decisions to recognise 
the implicit nature of beneficial ownership. 
7.4.1.1  Facts 
Diebold Courtage SA (hereafter Diebold) was a French company active in computer equipment 
rental. To operate its business, Diebold bought equipment and simultaneously sold it to 
Equilease CV, a Dutch partnership. In turn, Equilease CV rented the equipment to Diebold, 
which then sub-rented it to its French clients and paid rent to Equilease CV.388 The Dutch 
company had entered into a service contract with a related Swiss company. The contract caused 
approximately 68 percent of the royalties, paid by Diebold to Equilease, to be transferred to the 
Swiss company.389 
The double taxation convention of 1973 between the Netherlands and France provided for an 
exemption on royalties in the state of source, whereas French law provided for a 33.33 percent 
withholding tax on royalties paid to non-residents. The treaty, as it was ratified before 1977, 
did not include a beneficial ownership test.390 
The tax authorities argued that the treaty had to be put aside for two reasons: first, Equilease 
CV could not be regarded as a resident of the Netherlands under the treaty because it was a 
transparent entity (partnership) according to Dutch law and thus not subject to tax.391 
Subsidiarily, the authorities claimed that the Swiss company was, in fact, the beneficial owner 
of the royalties.392 
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The issue the Conseil d’État had to rule on was whether the France-Netherlands tax treaty could 
be ignored (and thus a 33.33 percent tax levied on the royalty payments), on the basis that 
Equilease was not the beneficial owner of the royalties, even though no provision in the treaty 
mentioned beneficial ownership.393 
7.4.1.2  Court’s Decision 
The court agreed with the tax authorities that a double taxation convention is not applicable if 
the recipient of the royalty payment is not the beneficial owner thereof, regardless of the treaty 
not mentioning such a requirement.394  
However, the Conseil d’État ruled in favour of the taxpayer because the tax authorities failed 
to demonstrate that the amounts transferred to the Swiss company (approximately 68% of the 
royalties) were excessive in consideration of the services provided. The transactions being at 
arm’s length, the payments were insufficient in proving that the Swiss company was the 
beneficial owner of the royalties.395 The tax authorities also lost on the main issue, as the 
partners of the CV were Dutch residents, and as such eligible to treaty benefits.396 
7.4.1.3  Critical Remarks 
The arm’s length criterion does not seem relevant in interpreting beneficial ownership.397 
Indeed, although services may be rendered in relation to royalties and interest, albeit rarely, the 
situation is not conceivable with dividends. 
Unlike other decisions (e.g. Indofood398 and Prévost399), the Diebold case does not address the 
definition of beneficial ownership.400 Furthermore, the case is criticisable insofar as the court 
seems to have, before the OECD, considered that beneficial ownership only clarifies ‘paid 
to’.401  
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Although the court considered that beneficial ownership was a general condition of application 
of tax treaties, even when not explicitly provided for, the actual impact of the Diebold case was 
later somewhat diminished. Indeed, the Conseil d’État gave an opinion to the French 
government, wherein it confirmed the applicability of the beneficial ownership test whenever 
France is the state of source, regardless of there being no reference to beneficial ownership in 
the treaty.402 However, the court specified that the Diebold doctrine only applied to situations 
where the concerned treaty was ratified before the introduction of beneficial ownership the 
OECD Model.403  
In situations involving a treaty signed after 1977, but not containing a beneficial ownership 
provision, the Diebold case law is not relevant, and the concept not considered implicit to the 
treaty. The Conseil d’État has based this position on treaty interpretation, namely articles 31 
and 32 VCLT;404 if a treaty is signed after 1977 but contains no beneficial ownership provision, 
it cannot be argued in good faith that the contracting states wanted such a rule, nor is it 
compatible with contextual interpretation.405 Commentators have observed that the limited 
scope of the Diebold case is due to the court favouring static interpretation of double taxation 
conventions.406  
7.4.2 The Bank of Scotland Case 
The Conseil d’État had the opportunity to further analyse beneficial ownership in the Bank of 
Scotland case.407 Following this case, French courts have tended to combine the beneficial 
ownership test with the domestic abuse of law principle.408 
7.4.2.1  Facts 
The Bank of Scotland, a United Kingdom resident, bought a three-year-long usufruct on non-
voting shares issued by the French subsidiary of an American pharmaceutical company.409 The 
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acquisition was financed by one payment and allowed the bank to receive dividends from the 
French subsidiary over a three-year period. The American parent company had predetermined 
and guaranteed the amounts to be paid. Furthermore, the France-UK double taxation convention 
of 1968 provided for a withholding tax rate of 15 percent whereas the French domestic rate was 
25 percent. As a result, the Bank of Scotland was eligible to claim a refundable tax credit (avoir 
fiscal) to the French authorities. However, the sum of dividends, to be distributed by the French 
subsidiary, and refundable avoir fiscal was greater than what the bank had paid to acquire the 
usufruct on the shares of the French subsidiary.410 
The French tax authorities considered that the transaction was a form of treaty shopping and 
thus refused to apply the France-UK tax treaty, i.e. apply a lower withholding tax rate on 
dividends and refund the avoir fiscal.411  
The Cour Administrative d’Appel de Paris ruled, on appeal, that the usufruct agreement 
between the American company and the British bank was not a loan agreement and that the tax 
authorities had failed to demonstrate the existence of ‘fraud to the law’.412 
7.4.2.2  Court’s Decision 
The Conseil d’État reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the sale of the usufruct was 
a disguised loan agreement between the bank and the American parent company, wherein the 
French subsidiary reimbursed the loan through dividend payments and avoir fiscal refunds. 
According to the court, the sole purpose of the transaction was to abusively benefit from the 
France-UK treaty, as the France-US treaty would not have entitled the American company to 
an avoir fiscal refund.413  
The main reason for the court’s decision was that the Bank of Scotland had too many guarantees 
and thus bore no shareholder risk. Indeed, the usufruct agreement provided that an indemnity 
would be paid to the bank if dividends were not distributed by the French subsidiary, another 
indemnity was included in the event of the tax authorities refusing the avoir fiscal refund. 
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Moreover, the bank could sell its shares back to the American company if the quarterly results 
of the French subsidiary were below a predetermined threshold.414  
Furthermore, the court considered that the American parent was the beneficial owner of the 
dividends and consequently that the British bank was not entitled to treaty benefits (i.e. partial 
refund of the withholding tax).415 
7.4.2.3  Critical Remarks 
Article 9 of the double taxation convention between the United Kingdom and France, provided 
for a beneficial ownership test under its section 6, which dealt with the reduction of withholding 
tax. However, section 7 of the same article, wherein the conditions for the refund of the avoir 
fiscal were listed, did not provide for a beneficial ownership test. Commentators have 
consequently argued that the judgment is “unsatisfactory from a legal perspective”416 as the 
court, by way of literal interpretation, should not have ruled that the treaty provided for a 
beneficial ownership test in the present case.417 Such reasoning would have had no consequence 
on the result of the decision, as the Conseil d’État had already held, in the Diebold case,418 that 
the beneficial ownership test applies to a treaty even when not expressly provided for therein.419 
The decision can be explained by the court’s intent on avoiding to set aside a tax treaty on the 
grounds of a domestic general anti-avoidance doctrine.420 
The Conseil d’État has a broad interpretation of beneficial ownership. Indeed, the Bank of 
Scotland was neither a nominee nor an agent and could thus not be excluded under the general 
understanding of beneficial ownership in the existing OECD material. Moreover, the court 
never denied that the bank had full right of use and enjoyment on the dividends it received, nor 
was an obligation to further transfer them found. Gutmann argues that under the Discussion 
Draft of 2011, the bank qualified as beneficial owner.421 
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It can be argued that the beneficial ownership test was a consequence of the ‘abuse of law’ 
analysis conducted by the Conseil d’État.422 In other words, the court distorted the meaning of 
beneficial ownership because it wanted “to apply the French general anti-avoidance theory 
without formally departing from the treaty rule.”423 
Some commentators have argued that the Bank of Scotland case is not relevant in understanding 
beneficial ownership because the decision only dealt with the “appropriate qualification of a 
so-called usufruct contract [into a loan agreement]”.424 
The Bank of Scotland case is important as it follows from it that, from a French point of view, 
beneficial ownership is not only applicable to cases of payment forwarding to third parties but 
also where ‘fraud of the law’ is found.425 In my opinion, linking beneficial ownership to ‘abuse 
of law’ would imply that the former has a subjective nature. Indeed, ‘abuse of law’ is the 
consequence of a party’s fraudulent intentions, and thus necessarily embodies a subjective 
aspect. Moreover, the wide interpretation of beneficial ownership by French courts is 
problematic as it ignores that beneficial ownership should be construed as a specific anti-abuse 
rule. 
7.5   Italy: Supreme Court Decision no. 27113 
On 28 December 2016, the Italian Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying the concept of 
beneficial ownership in a case of dividend payments between an Italian subsidiary and its 
French parent. The case presents the particularity of dealing with a holding company’s 
substance and the relevance thereof to establish beneficial ownership. 
7.5.1 Facts 
An Italian subsidiary distributed dividend to its parent, a French holding company, itself owned 
by an American company. The French company filed for a refund of the withholding tax as 
provided by the France-Italy tax treaty and Italian domestic law. Under the applicable double 
taxation convention, the reduced tax rate was set at 5 percent. There were two conditions to 
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apply for the tax relief: beneficial ownership of the dividends and residence in the other 
contracting state (i.e. France). 
The tax authorities rejected the claim of the French company, arguing that is was a conduit 
solely established to enjoy treaty benefits and transferring the dividends to its American parent. 
The company appealed and won against the tax authorities before a tax court. The tax authorities 
appealed to an appellate court which reversed the decision in their favour. The French company 
then appealed to the Supreme Court. 426 
7.5.2 Court’s Decision  
The Supreme Court held that beneficial ownership ensures that treaty reliefs are only granted 
to a company with full legal and economic control on the dividends, and which is the final 
recipient thereof. The court consequently ruled that treaty benefits, under the substance over 
form approach, should be denied to entities lacking substance that are interposed solely for tax 
reasons. The court further held that the beneficial ownership requirement is a specific anti-abuse 
provision, comparable to other domestic and EU anti-avoidance rules.427 The court did not 
address whether a general anti-abuse rule was applicable. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court considered that for pure holding companies (i.e. primarily 
owning and managing subsidiary shares), the lack of economic substance does not necessarily 
indicate lack of beneficial ownership. Rather, the court considered that the beneficial ownership 
of pure holding companies must be assessed under two exclusive factors:428 first, the recipient 
must be the legal owner of the income. Secondly, the recipient must be independent; the 
independence of the holding company depends on whether it can retain the dividends received 
without being obligated to forward them to another entity. Accordingly, the court held that the 
French company was the beneficial owner of the dividends. 
The court seems to follow a narrow approach to beneficial ownership, close to the one provided 
for in the OECD Commentary 2014, which it mentions in its judgment. Indeed, the court’s 
analysis focuses on the company’s control of the dividend, irrespective of the former’s 
substance. The decision is interesting insofar as it deals with a holding company with no 
substance without considering the entity to be a conduit. In doing so, the Supreme Court follows 
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the Conduit Companies Report of 1987, which recognised that “the fact that [the] main function 
[of a company] is to hold assets or rights is not itself sufficient to categorise it as a mere 
intermediary [i.e. conduit].”429 The court’s reasoning is comparable to the Tax Court of 
Canada’s in the Prévost case, where corporate substance was ignored, and legal ownership 
considered foremost. 
  
                                                 
429 OECD, Conduit Companies Report of 1987, p. 8 
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8 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP AND THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE TEST 
8.1  BEPS Action 6 
The BEPS Project consists of 15 actions designed to address base erosion and profit shifting 
(hereafter BEPS). Action 6,430 which is one of the four BEPS minimum standards,431 deals with 
treaty abuse which includes treaty shopping.432 The main proposition of Action 6 is to introduce 
anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties.  
One of these provisions is the LOB rule which is designed to address treaty shopping. Under 
the LOB rule, the granting of treaty benefits to entities is contingent on the entities meeting 
certain conditions (legal nature of the entity, ownership, general activities) which ensure that 
the relation between the entity and its state of residence is not merely formal. 
8.2  The MLI 
The MLI is a complex international instrument; its purpose is to offer a fast track, compared to 
bilateral double taxation convention negotiations, to the implementation of BEPS treaty 
measures.433 The advantage of such an instrument is that it dissuades states from adopting 
unilateral measures which would be contrary to the coordinated approach taken by the 
OECD.434 However, bilateral treaties and amending protocols may still be used to implement 
BEPS treaty measures.435 The MLI has not yet entered into force.436 
Pursuant to a distinction already made in BEPS Action 6, the MLI is divided into minimum 
standards, rules that must be adopted if signing the MLI, and optional provisions, which 
includes both opt-in and opt-out provisions.437 
The first minimum standard to be included in the contracting states’ tax treaties, through 
ratification of the MLI or amendment of double taxation conventions, is a preamble, which 
specifies that the treaty is set on elimination double taxation, non-taxation, and reduced taxation 
through tax avoidance. “Treaty shopping aimed at obtaining reliefs” is also mentioned amongst 
                                                 
430 OECD, Action 6 Final Report. 
431 Together with Action 5, 13 and 14. 
432 OECD, Action 6 Final Report, p. 9. 
433 DANON/SALOMÉ, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument, p. 199. 
434 KLEIST, Multilateral Instrument, p. 824. 
435 DANON/SALOMÉ, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument, p. 199. 
436 31 December 2017. 
437 DANON, Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World, p. 39. 
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the goals of the treaty.438 According to the OECD, this preamble, although not a provision, 
should be relevant when interpreting the MLI because it qualifies as ‘context’ under article 
31(2) VCLT. Some authors have however argued that the treaty’s object cannot supersede a 
clear substantive provision.439 Danon further argues that the primary objective of tax treaties 
will nonetheless remain the avoidance of double taxation.440 
The second minimum standard is a substantive treaty anti-avoidance rule. States will be free to 
choose between the PPT rule or a LOB rule (thus opting out of the PPT rule).441 Opting out of 
the PPT rule is only possible if the contracting state amends its LOB rule to deal with conduit 
company arrangements. This can be done by either adopting an ad hoc PPT rule which only 
applies to conduits, introducing a specific domestic anti-abuse rule or through judicial 
precedent.442 
The recommendations of the MLI are a set of specific anti-abuse rules,443 each designed for a 
form of treaty abuse. As they are not part of the minimum standard these rules may be opted 
out of.444 A savings clause has also been included in the MLI.445 
8.3  The PPT Rule 
A GAAR is also introduced in the OECD Model446 and the MLI447 to deal with other forms of 
treaty abuse, including treaty shopping situations not addressed by the LOB rule. This GAAR 
is called the principal purpose test (hereafter PPT) and focuses on the principal purposes of 
arrangements or transactions (i.e. the rationale thereof). The PPT rule is a minimal standard of 
BEPS Action 6. Article 7(1) MLI provides the following PPT rule:  
Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the 
Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital 
if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, 
that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or 
transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established 
                                                 
438 OECD Commentary 2017, para. 75 ad art. 6(1) MLI. 
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that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.448 
According to the OECD, the PPT rule is a codification of the ‘guiding principle’.449 The guiding 
principle was introduced in the OECD Commentary in 2003 to deal with treaty abuse. However, 
the wording of the guiding principle450 is not identical to the PPT rule.451 The differences are 
twofold: first, the PPT rule applies regardless of other treaty provisions; and second, the PPT is 
applicable “unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in 
accordance with the object of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.”452 
Commentators have argued that the PPT rule is controversial because it reverses the burden of 
proof on the taxpayer.453 
8.4  Beneficial Ownership and the PPT 
Action 6, while addressing conduit structures with the PPT rule (or anti-conduit mechanisms 
producing similar results) does not refer to the beneficial ownership concept. Commentators 
argue that the relation between beneficial ownership and the PPT rule varies depending on the 
meaning given to the former. Indeed, to summarise, beneficial ownership may be construed in 
a substance over form approach or in a formal and legal way. It follows that beneficial 
ownership will not interact in the same way with the PPT rule depending on how it is construed. 
The 2014 OECD Commentary reduced the scope of beneficial ownership; arguably the concept 
no longer covers conduit companies. Furthermore, the Action 6 report does not consider 
beneficial ownership to apprehend conduit arrangements. Moreover, according to the report, 
conduit structures should be dealt with either by the PPT rule or with a specific anti-conduit 
rule.454 This interpretation is confirmed by the 2017 amendment to the OECD Commentary, 
which mentions that the PPT rule applies to “limitations on the taxing rights of a Contracting 
State in respect of dividends, interest or royalties arising in that State, and paid to a resident of 
the other State (who is the beneficial owner) under Article 10, 11 or 12.”455 
                                                 
448 Art. 7(1) MLI. 
449 DANON, Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World, p. 37. 
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However, several jurisdictions have retained a broad and objective meaning of beneficial 
ownership. Generally, the situation is somewhat attributable to the fact that relevant beneficial 
ownership case law predates the 2014 amendment to the Commentary and thus did not take into 
account the narrowing of the beneficial ownership scope. However, some jurisdictions, like 
Switzerland, have given a broad and objective meaning to beneficial ownership in judgments 
despite the 2014 update.  
Notwithstanding chronological considerations, broadly construed beneficial ownership can be 
conflicting with the PPT rule. Indeed, under this conception of beneficial ownership, the 
concept applies to most conduit arrangements.456 Thus, in a case involving a conduit company, 
beneficial ownership is a specific treaty abuse provision whereas the PPT rule is a GAAR, 
therefore, under the lex specialis derogat legi generali doctrine, the beneficial ownership test 
supersedes the PPT rule.  
However, the PPT rule applies “[n]otwithstanding any provisions in the Covered Tax 
Agreement”, which seems to indicate that both the GAAR, i.e. the PPT rule, and a SAAR would 
be applicable cumulatively. 
Danon and Salomé suggest that in these situations, the application of the beneficial ownership 
test would not always have the same consequences as the PPT rule.457 In Switzerland, for 
instance, the FSC’s case law does not take into consideration the taxpayer’s intentions when 
assessing beneficial ownership; in other words, the FSC does not give beneficial ownership a 
subjective meaning.458 It follows that contrary to the PPT rule, which takes into account the 
purpose and business rationale of transactions, the beneficial ownership test, under certain 
judicial interpretation (i.e. broad and objective meaning of beneficial ownership), would lead 
to denying treaty benefits where the application of the PPT rule would have dictated that they 
be granted.459 The findings of the authors are confirmed by an example provided by the OECD 
in the 2017 amendment to the Commentary.460 It is interesting to note that said example has 
been borrowed from the Technical Explanation of the US-UK double taxation convention, 
                                                 
456 DANON/SALOMÉ, The BEPS Multilateral Instrument, p. 240. 
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which was published in 2001, which explains the application of the anti-conduit rule461 provided 
for in the treaty.462  
 
  
                                                 
461 Art. 3(1)(n). 
462 US Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation to the US-UK DTC, p. 130.  
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9 CONCLUSION 
9.1  Beneficial Ownership Case Law  
As seen throughout this contribution, beneficial ownership has been interpreted and construed 
in diverse ways in different jurisdictions. Two trends appear in the case law reviewed herein: a 
substance reasoning has been adopted in countries like France and Switzerland; other countries, 
such as Canada and to some extent Italy, have taken a more narrow, formal and legal 
interpretation, which is arguably more in line with the OECD Commentary 2014. Arguably, the 
case law of some countries, needs to be adjusted in consideration of the Commentary. 
9.2  OECD Evolution 
Historically, the OECD has shown to be inconsistent in how it interprets beneficial ownership; 
the documentation is at times contradictory, and it remains difficult to construe the concept 
accordingly.  
The term was initially, in 1977, meant to ensure agents and nominees would not benefit from 
tax reliefs. The Conduit Companies Report considered an extension of the concept to income 
recipients who had functions similar to agents and nominees, e.g. a conduit company with 
narrow powers on its income. The 2003 Commentary focused on a meaning of beneficial 
ownership which is not narrow or technical; recipients with narrow powers over their income 
did not meet the beneficial ownership requirements.  
As of 2014, the concept has been narrowed (compared to the 2003 Commentary). Indeed, the 
OECD uses beneficial ownership as a narrow anti-avoidance provision meant for certain 
conduit arrangements. Under the current conception of the term, beneficial ownership is to be 
denied to the recipient if he is bound by a legal obligation dependent on the receipt of income 
subject to treaty relief. This legal obligation may be assessed on legal and factual evidence. 
Agents and nominees continue to be barred from treaty benefits. Finally, beneficial ownership 
is considered to have an autonomous meaning, which excludes domestic law. 
9.3  Renaming the Term ‘Beneficial Owner’ 
Several remedies to beneficial ownership have been suggested. Some argue that the term 
‘owner’, construed under article 31(1) VCLT, is confusing as it implies that legal ownership is 
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a requirement of beneficial ownership, which is not the case.463 Consequently, a renaming of 
the term ‘beneficial owner’ has been suggested, with the preferred replacement term being 
‘effective beneficiary’.464  
This new term would have three advantages. First, the word ‘owner’ would no longer appear, 
second, the new term would be closer to its translation in French, the other authentic language 
of the OECD MC, and third, the term would not be wrongly assimilated to beneficial ownership 
as understood in trust law.  
I find this proposition interesting. However, its implementation would be extremely complex. 
Indeed, double taxation conventions would have to be amended one by one as the use of an 
instrument of magnitude comparable to the MLI is not foreseeable for a simple lexical update. 
Furthermore, if this suggestion were adopted, the interpretation of older treaties with the 
language ‘beneficial owner’ would certainly be controversial and the overall situation no better. 
9.4  Necessity of Beneficial Ownership 
The necessity, whether initial465 or actual,466 of beneficial ownership, has been mentioned by 
several commentators.  
Whether beneficial ownership has become redundant because of the implementation of BEPS 
Action 6 in the MLI is an interesting premise. If beneficial ownership is construed as a specific 
anti-abuse rule dealing with the exclusion of conduit companies from treaty benefits, then the 
answer is probably affirmative. Indeed, the MLI provides for a PPT rule perfectly capable of 
addressing conduit arrangements. Moreover, the countries which have not opted for the PPT 
rule, in favour of the LOB rule, are in return expected to adopt anti-conduit rules.  
Strictly speaking, the application of a PPT rule renders beneficial ownership unnecessary for 
the purpose of dealing with conduits. The lack of consideration for beneficial ownership in 
BEPS Action 6 indicates that the OECD shares this position. However, the concept does retain 
some utility in dealing with agents and nominees, as well as some trustees; more so given that 
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Action 6 does not specifically address their situation. Moreover, the LOB rule is not designed 
for nominees and agents, and its application to trusts raises several issues.467 
However, beneficial ownership conserves some utility for two reasons, first the concept, 
although somewhat outdated and inefficient when compared to newer anti-abuse provisions, 
does remain the most common anti-treaty shopping rule. Many treaties still largely rely on the 
beneficial ownership test to avoid treaty shopping and will continue to do so despite the MLI’s 
upcoming entry into force. Indeed, numerous double taxation conventions will remain 
unaffected by the instrument. 
The initial necessity of beneficial ownership may also be challenged. Specific anti-conduit rules 
have existed for a long time in double taxation conventions.468 These provisions dismiss the 
application of articles 10, 11 and 12, if the considered situation qualifies as a conduit 
arrangement, the latter being usually defined in the provision.  
9.5  Tax Treaty Policy 
Furthermore, one might consider that the risk of treaty shopping can be reduced through policy. 
Indeed, countries with a wide network of double taxation conventions may somewhat avoid 
treaty shopping when the withholding tax rates stipulated in the treaties are identical (e.g. 15 
percent on dividends as provided by the OECD MC for non-qualified shareholding). Indeed, 
the incentive of a taxpayer to claim benefits under the wrong tax treaty disappears if a more 
favourable tax rate is not provided for and that his state of residence has signed a tax treaty with 
the state of source.  
Moreover, there seems to be a trend in some jurisdictions to amend double taxation conventions 
which previously provided for an exemption on dividends, interests or royalties. Switzerland, 
for instance, renegotiated a tax treaty which provided for exemptions on dividends from 
portfolio shares;469 in fact, the Total Return Swaps landmark decision dealt with an exemption 
provision on dividends which had already been amended at the time of the judgment.  
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9.6  OECD Definition of Beneficial Ownership  
For the foreseeable future, beneficial ownership will probably remain present in the OECD MC 
and a number of tax treaties. If the OECD does not intend to fully abandon the concept, it would 
be opportune to insert a definition of the term ‘beneficial owner’ under article 3(1) OECD MC. 
A Model definition was already suggested in 2012 by commentators,470 in response to the 2011 
Discussion Draft, but was regrettably not envisaged by the OECD. There would undoubtedly 
be difficulties in reaching a consensus on a definition amongst member states, but if successful 
the process could amount to a true clarification. 
 
                                                 
470 IBFD Research Staff, Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner”. 
